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My dissertation comprises two chapters. The first chapter uses country-level data
and examines the diminishing effect of financial development on innovation, and how
“too much finance” affects economic growth through this diminishing effect. The
second chapter uses industry-level data aggregated from firm-level data to examine
the nonlinear effect of financial development on innovation as well as explores the
channels.
The first chapter explores the nonlinear effect of financial development on inno-
vation and growth. We show that the expansion of the financial sector may hurt
innovative activities and hence the innovation-led growth, using data on 50 countries
over the 1990-2016 period. Countries with a higher level of financial development are
found to have a smaller positive or insignificant effect on innovation. The marginal
effect of innovation on growth is a decreasing function of financial development. Us-
ing a novel dynamic panel threshold method we examine the possible non-linearity
between finance, innovation, and growth. We find that innovation exhibits an in-
significant effect on output growth when credit to the private sector exceeds the level
of 60% as a share of GDP. These results are not driven by banking crises, the long-run
effect of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, or the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis.
The second chapter studies the nonlinear effect of financial development on innova-
tion as well as the potential channels, primarily using a unique database constructed
from the Worldscope Fundamentals Annual from 1980 to 2017. Our results can be
summarized as follows. 1) Using a broad index of financial development, we find that
the overall effect on innovation is a diminishing one, and the patterns are robust un-
der different robustness checks. 2) We also have documented that, using traditional
one-dimension indicators of financial development for both equity and credit markets,
equity markets have a kick-in effect on innovation, while the diminishing effects still
hold for credit markets. 3) We find industry-specific effects. In particular, the equity
market development has a diminishing effect on innovations in high-technology in-
dustries, while credit market development has a diminishing effect on innovations in
non-high-technology industries. 4) We show that the nonlinear effect of financial de-
velopment on market competition serves as a potential channel through which finance
affects innovation nonlinearly. 5) Our last finding is that the effect is heterogeneous
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CHAPTER I
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION-LED GROWTH:
IS TOO MUCH FINANCE BETTER?
1. Introduction
The basic Schumpeterian model of economic growth considers technological progress
as an important factor for long-run growth ([Schumpeter, 1934]). The positive role of
innovation on growth has been discussed and tested by a number of subsequent works
([Scherer et al., 1986], [Freeman et al., 1994]). Among determinants of innovation,
R&D expenditure, talents, technology transfer and networking have been identified
as important factors that shape and promote innovation and hence the innovation-led
growth ([Love and Roper, 1999], [Acemoglu et al., 2016]). Recent years have seen an
expansion in financial sector around the world with several implications on innovation
and growth. First, financial development may facilitate innovation activities by allevi-
ating credit constraints on the flow of capital to its most productive projects and hence
promote R&D financing and growth (e.g. [King and Levine, 1993a, King and Levine, 1993b],
[Benfratello et al., 2008], [Brown et al., 2009], [Amore et al., 2013], [Gorodnichenko, 2013],
[Hsu et al., 2014] and [Levine et al., 2017]). Second, the expansion of financial sector
has raised the concern of “brain drain” between industries ([Boustanifar et al., 2017]).
Third, credit expansion shows its dark side on resource allocation, both on physical
and human capital ([Tobin, 1984], [Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015] and [Borio et al., 2016]).
The main outline of this chapter is the result of joint work with Stylianos Asimakopoulos and Jaebeom Kim.
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Collectively, these competing theories and evidences lead to the following ques-
tions: What is the overall effect of financial development on innovation? Will the
monotonic relationship between finance and innovation hold as financial sector con-
tinues to expand? How does financial development affect innovation-led growth?
This paper attempts to answer these questions empirically. Previous studies on
the finance-innovation-growth nexus support the existence of a positive monotonic
relationship. However, we explore whether there exists a non-monotonic relationship
with a possible threshold effect. Specifically, our study is conducted in two parts.
First, we examine the nonlinear relationship between financial development and in-
novation. Second, we study the role of financial development on the innovation-growth
relationship. To this end, we use two different methods to explore the possible non-
linearities. Initially we qualitatively split the sample into different subgroups by the
level of financial development and income and apply a system-GMM to estimate
the effect of financial development on innovation for each group. The system-GMM
methodology allows us to use the lagged value of dependent and independent vari-
ables to account for potential endogeneity issues. However, this method may not give
precise estimation on the threshold value at which the effect changes, if any. For
this reason, we also employ a novel GMM model developed by [Seo and Shin, 2016].
This model extends the [Hansen, 1999] and [Caner and Hansen, 2004] static panel
threshold model and the [Kremer et al., 2013] dynamic panel threshold model by
allowing for the transitional variable and other covariates to be endogenous. The
[Seo and Shin, 2016]’s method requires the use of balanced panel with large n and
small T . We curtail the data to fit the model using five years non-overlapping aver-
age data, which is also consistent with the related growth literature (see for example
[Asimakopoulos and Karavias, 2016] and references therein). To guarantee that our
data contains roughly equal proportion of developing and developed countries, we
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consider only the financial development in credit market. Thus, we end up with a
balanced panel of 50 countries from 1990 to 2016, including 22 developing and 28
developed countries.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that the overall effect of
financial development on innovation is positive. However, this effect is lower when
financial development exceeds a certain level. Second, the overall effect of innovation
on growth is positive and heterogeneous across the various levels of financial develop-
ment. Third, the dynamic panel threshold method shows the existence of non-linear
relationship between innovation and growth with a threshold value around 60% of
GDP. Our threshold value reflects the difference between the threshold model used
in our paper, dealing with monotonicity and endogeneity simultaneously compared
to previous studies, as well as the impact of global financial integration. Financial
integration may enhance the positive effect of financial development on innovation
and growth leading to a smaller threshold value of financial development.
Credit expansion may lead to banking crisis or economic crisis and the innova-
tion activities may be dampened during the crisis ([Döner, 2017], [OECD, 2012],
[Comin and Gertler, 2006] and [Francois and Lloyd-Ellis, 2008]). Therefore, the ob-
served vanishing effect may be caused by banking crisis. To check whether the thresh-
old effects are affected by crisis, we interact the crisis dummy with the variable of
interest and estimate the difference in the effect between crisis and tranquil period.
Our findings indicate an insignificant negative effect on the interaction term.
The 2007-2008 financial crisis may have a long run negative effect on innovation.
In our sample, 39.2% of the high income countries’ innovation never recover to their
pre-crisis level and 22.7% of middle income countries’ innovation sink after the finan-
cial crisis. The subsequent European sovereign debt crisis continually depresses the
innovative activities for many countries in Euro Zone (EZ) and probably countries
3
outside the EZ since 2010. We find that 67.86% of high income countries experienced
a reduction in innovation after 2010 and 50% of middle income countries have seen
a sluggish recovery in innovation. The situation does not get ameliorated even for
countries with high quality of governance. During the same period, however, we find
that the level of credit is higher in high income countries and in countries with high
governance quality. The documented non-linearity using full sample may be contam-
inated by the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis and the long run negative effect
of the recent financial crisis. Using a sub-sample from 1990 to 2009, we find a robust
non-linearity between finance, innovation, and growth.
Our paper relates and contributes to several strands of theory relating growth,
innovation and financial-market development. Our findings provide consistent re-
sults with several theoretical predictions and recent empirical studies. Regarding
the finance-innovation nexus, [Tobin, 1984] mentioned that too many financial ac-
tivities may misallocate resources, both physical and human capital, from produc-
tion sector to less productive financial sector. [Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015] and
[Borio et al., 2016] elaborate this idea by showing that less productive but more
pledgeable projects are easily financed during financial sector expansions. When
credit inflates, workers, especially the talented STEM workers, are lured into low pro-
ductivity gains sectors due to high finance compensation ([Axelson and Bond, 2015],
[Boustanifar et al., 2017] and [Célérier and Vallée, 2017]). Both channels hurt real
sector by reducing the innovation capacity. [Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998], using firm
level data, show that close firm-bank ties may facilitate firms to access credit, but it
may also prevent firms from involving risky and high return projects such as R&D
activities. [Morales, 2003] introduces financial sector in an endogenous growth model
and shows that financial activity may have two opposite external effects on research
productivity. On one hand, the positive effect of financial activity will spill over to
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other sectors of the economy and promote productivity. On the other hand, this
positive externality would induce creative destruction process and discourage the in-
centives to invest in R&D. Inspired by the work of [Klette and Kortum, 2004] and
[Akcigit and Kerr, 2018], where different types of innovations are introduced in a
growth model, [Philippe et al., 2018] argue that the introduction of financial devel-
opment into these models may result in two competing effects. First, potentially
good innovators may face less financing constraints to enter the market due to the
development of financial market, which in turn is beneficial to aggregate innovation
and growth. Second, less credit constraints may make it easier for less efficient firms
to remain in the market and prevent more efficient innovators from entering the mar-
ket. This in turn may be harmful to aggregate innovation and growth. As financial
sector continues to expand in modern economy and credit constraints are alleviated
for many firms, it is uncertain whether the overall effect of financial development on
innovation is monotonic or not.
In terms of the finance-growth relationship, our results are consistent with several
recent empirical papers showing that “too much finance” may hurt economic growth.
Using country- and industry-level panel data, [Arcand et al., 2015] test the non-
linearity between private credit and growth by including both the private credit and
its square term into the growth equation, deriving a threshold point of around 100%
of GDP. Private credit tends to promote growth in the lower regime, while the effect
turns negative in the upper regime. In a similar fashion, [Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012]
estimate the threshold to be nearly 100% of GDP. The baseline models used in these
two studies, however, may suffer from endogeneity and multicollinearity issues (see
[Law and Singh, 2014] for discussions). In an attempt to control for these issues,
[Law and Singh, 2014] use a panel threshold model proposed by [Kremer et al., 2013]
to re-estimate the possible threshold effect of private credit on growth and they obtain
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a threshold of around 88% of GDP. Using both a dynamic panel threshold approach
and an autoregressive distributed lag ARDL(p,q) model, [Samargandi et al., 2015] es-
tablish the non-monotonic effect of financial development and growth among middle
income countries, suggesting a turning point around 91% of GDP. However, most of
these studies do not explicitly or directly explore the sources of non-linearity between
financial development and growth.
The above discussions may generate two implications. First, financial development
may have a diminishing effect on the rate of innovation, such effect transmits to pro-
ductivity and slows down aggregate growth. Second, financial development may also
make innovations per se less effective in promoting growth. For an innovation to be
effective in promoting productivity and aggregate growth, necessary complementary
inventions and follow-up investment in productive capital is required. However, as
credit market expands, banks may also prevent firms from involving risky projects
such as R&D activities, causing less productive but more pledgeable projects to be
easily financed. The relatively less investment of productive capital may prolong the
implementation and restructuring lags and reduce the contribution of innovation on
productivity and economic growth.
Most related to our work are studies by [Law et al., 2018] and [Xiao and Zhao, 2012].
[Law et al., 2018] document an inverted U-shaped relationship between financial de-
velopment and innovation using a panel of 75 countries over 1996-2010. Their analysis
is embodied in the context of institution quality where the effect of finance on inno-
vation depends upon the quality of institutions. Our study does not consider the
context of institution quality because there is high overlapping between countries
with high quality of governance, high income countries and countries with high level
of financial development. [Xiao and Zhao, 2012] find that credit market development
significantly enhances firm innovation in countries with lower government ownership
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of banks, while the effect turns to insignificant or even negative when government
ownership increases.
Our study contributes to the related literature in three ways. First, we pro-
vide direct evidences that finance-innovation-growth nexus follows a non-linear re-
lationship as credit expands. The findings show that the threshold effect between
finance and innovation serves as a possible channel through which too much finance
may harm growth. Second, we also find that the effect of innovation on growth
is weakened by too much finance. Finally, this empirical work is conducted using
a novel GMM method developed by [Seo and Shin, 2016]. This model extends the
[Hansen, 1999] and [Caner and Hansen, 2004] static panel threshold model and the
[Kremer et al., 2013] panel threshold model by allowing for the transitional variable
and other covariates to be endogenous. Therefore, this new dynamic panel threshold
model accounts for the endogeneity issue that is ignored by previous studies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 specifies the empirical
models and describes the data. Section 3 presents and discusses the results. Section
4 concludes.
2. Empirical Specifications and Data
2.1. Empirical strategies
The empirical analysis consists of two parts. First, we examine the non-linear re-
lationship between financial development and innovation. Second, we estimate how
financial development affect the innovation-growth relationship. To this end, we em-
ploy two different methods: linear system GMM and a dynamic panel threshold.
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2.1.1. Linear system-GMM
In the linear system-GMM method, we qualitatively split the sample into two groups
by the level of financial development. We initially sort the countries by their level
of financial development. Then we define the top 25 countries as high financial de-
velopment countries and the bottom 25 countries as the low financial development
countries. This strategy may not give a precise estimation of the threshold level
of financial development, but it enables us to build an intuition about the possible
nonlinearity between finance, innovation and growth. In our sample, high income
countries are typically associated with high level of financial development. As a ro-
bustness check, we also split the sample into two groups by their level of GDP per
capita: high income countries and middle incomes1. For each of the five groups, we
consider the following specification for the innovation equation:
innovationit = ρinnovationit−1 + αjFDit + βXit + ui + vt + eit (1)
where innovationit and innovationit−1 are the current and lagged indicator of inno-
vation. Xit denotes the control set including FDI, schooling, population, GDP per
capita, and the protection for intellectual property right. FDit denotes the finan-
cial development indicators. ui is the country fixed effect that absorbs the effect of
country level variation, vt captures the time fixed effect, which controls for possible
cross-sectional dependences. eit captures the stochastic error term. j is an indicator
of high and low level of financial development or high and middle income countries.
System-GMM use the lagged dependent variable and regressors to instrument for pos-
sible endogeneity issues. In our setting, there are two possible causes of endogeneity:
the omitted variable issue and reverse causality between financial development and
1In our sample, there are no low income countries due to the unavailability of data in indicators of financial
development, innovation indicators, and other variables
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innovation. First, if innovationit−1 is correlated with eit, then in the first-difference
transformed equation, ∆innovationit−1 would correlate with ∆eit. Second, technol-
ogy change relating to communication and data processing have greatly promoted the
development of financial services ([Frame et al., 2014]). As instruments we lag our
variables twice for the difference equation and once for the level equation. All the
variables used are five years non-overlapping average data.
Next, we consider how financial development affect the innovation-led growth. In
a similar spirit, we split the sample by the level of financial development and GDP
per capita. Specifically, we consider the effect of innovation on growth for the high
level financial development countries, low level financial development countries, high
income countries and middle income countries. For each group we consider the fol-
lowing growth regression:
yit = ρyit−1 + αinnovationit + γZit + ui + τt + eit (2)
where yit and yit−1 represent current and lagged growth rate of GDP per capita, re-
spectively. innovationit is the same as in the innovation regression. Zit is the control
set including government expenditure (%GDP), trade (%GDP), investment (%GDP),
inflation rate (%), Schooling and initial GDP per capita. ui, τt and eit refer to country
fixed effects, time fixed effects, and stochastic error term, respectively. Notice that
our specification is different from conventional regression specified in growth litera-
tures, where yit usually refers to GDP per capita. In our sample, GDP per capita is
quite persistent and the Harris-Tzavalis test([Harris and Tzavalis, 1999]) shows that
GDP per capita is not stationary2. Using growth rate of per capita GDP instead of
the level does not change our interpretation of the coefficient on variables of interest
(see also [Asimakopoulos and Karavias, 2016]).
2We use H-T test because our sample contains relatively larger panel and smaller time period, Harris-Tzavalis test
best fit sample structure like this.
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As a robustness check, we also consider the interaction between financial develop-
ment and innovation. The specification is as follow:
yit = ρyit−1 + αinnovationit + βFDit ∗ innovationit + γZit + ui + τt + eit (3)
The marginal effect of innovation on growth is α̂ + β̂ ∗ FDit. According to the theo-
retical prediction, higher level of financial development reduces productivity via brain
drain or misallocation in physical capital and the effect of innovation on growth is
lower in countries with higher level of financial development. Therefore, if there
exists any “diminishing effect” for the innovation-growth nexus due to financial de-
velopment, α is expected to be greater than zero, while β is expected to be negative.
2.1.2. Dynamic panel threshold model with endogenous threshold variable
Although the linear system-GMM method helps us to build an intuition about the
non-linearity, it gives neither a rigorous test on the linearity nor the estimated thresh-
old value at which the effect begins to change. For this reason, we examine the above
two questions using a novel GMM method developed by [Seo and Shin, 2016]. This
model extends the [Hansen, 1999] and [Caner and Hansen, 2004] static panel thresh-
old model and the [Kremer et al., 2013] panel threshold model by allowing for the
transitional variable and other covariates to be endogenous. To estimate the co-
efficients, they propose a First Difference GMM (FD-GMM) transformation. This
algorithm relaxes the exogeneity assumption on regressors and threshold variable and
guarantee that the estimators follow a normal distribution asymptotically, which val-
idates the use of Wald test for standard statistical inference on threshold and other
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parameters. For the innovation equation, we extend equation (1) to:
innovationit = ρinnovationit−1 + αLFDitI(FDit ≤ γ) + αHFDitI(FDit > γ) + βXit + ui + τt + eit
(4)
Note that, the financial development is treated as regime dependent variable as well as
transitional variable. I(·) is an indicator of the regime. γ is a hypothetical threshold
value. The subscripts L and H on α refer to lower and upper regime, respectively. The
instrument variables include the exogenous variables, the lagged dependent variable
and other covariates.
In a similar spirit we estimate our growth equation using a dynamic panel threshold
model. In particular, we treat financial development as the threshold variable, while
innovation is the regime dependent variable changing according to the estimated
threshold of financial development. The notation used here is similar to the innovation
equation (1). Therefore, the growth model presented in equation (2) becomes:
yit = ρyit−1 + βLinnovationit ∗ I(FDit ≤ γ) + βHinnovationit ∗ I(FDit > γ) + θZit + ui + τt + eit
(5)
For equations (4) and (5), we use the non-linearity test supW = supWn(γ) statistics
upon the null of αL − αH = 0 and βL − βH = 0, where Wn(γ) is the standard Wald
statistic for each fixed γ.
2.2. Data and summary statistics
A complete picture of financial development includes the development in both credit
and equity markets. Due to the limitation of stock market data in developing coun-
tries plus the fact that firms financing in developing countries is mainly through
internal retained profits and external credit market, we constraint our study to credit
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markets. The private credit by banks and other financial institutions as a share of
GDP is preferred in finance-growth literature ([Levine et al., 2000a]). As robustness
checks, we also consider credit issued to private sector by money deposite banks
(%GDP), demostic credit to private sector (%GDP) and liquidity liability (%GDP).
All the indicators are obtained from World Bank Financial Structure Database.3 The
banking crisis data is obtained from [Laeven and Valencia, 2013] Systemic Banking
Crises Database (1970-2011). Inspired by [Baker et al., 2016], the data of banking
crisis are extended to 2016 by searching for keywords that indicate a banking crisis
for each country between 2012 and 2016. The keywords used include bank run, bank
crisis and illiquidity.4
The innovation is measured by patent applications per 100 billion USD obtained
from World Intellectual Property.5 This indicator is measured as total equivalent
counts by applicant’s origin. We use patent application as an indicator of innovation
to account for the truncation issue, since there are typically two to three years grant
lags between application and grant year. For example, the mean years of grant lags
for USPTO fluctuates between 26 months and 32 months and the distribution of
grant lags varies across fields of inventions ([Squicciarini et al., 2013]). Another rea-
son is that the application year better captures the actual effective time of innovation
([Griliches et al., 1986]) and an invention starts to affect the real economy since its
inception ([Hsu et al., 2014]). We have the following considerations when construct-
ing this variable. First, the selection of countries and period of time is based on the
availability of annual observations on patent applications. Second, countries with
3In our sample, New Zealand missed the indicators of financial development between 2012 and 2016 . To fill the
gaps, we use data for Broad Money, Private sector credit, Domestic credit, Exchange rate between New Zealand Dollar
and US Dollar, and Gross Domestic Product from Reserve Bank of New Zealand(https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics)
to construct the missing indicators in World Bank Financial Structure Database. In New Zealand, the private credit
by deposit banks and Private credit by banks and other financial institution are identical.
4Using this method, we detected several banking crisis for the following countries: China in 2014; Greece in 2015;
Portugal in 2014; Spain between 2012 and 2014
5We also consider using patent applications per million population as indicator of innovation, the correlation
between these two indicators is 0.9554 and the results are quite similar.
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many zeros or very small amount of patents and missing values are not considered.
Third, countries in our sample are expected to exhibit different stages of development.
We also use the number of utility models as another measure of innovation. This
indicator is obtained from WIPO. The major differences between patents and util-
ity models are as follows. First, the requirements for acquiring a utility model are
less stringent than for patents. Second, utility models are cheaper to obtain and to
maintain. Third, the term of protection for utility models is shorter than for patents.
Therefore, in many countries, utility models are sometimes referred to as “second-class
patents”. Thus, patents and utility models represent different quality of innovation.6
Throughout this paper, patents are used as the primary indicator of innovation in
the regressions. However, we provide the estimation results for utility models in the
dynamic threshold regression as an additional robustness check. The last indicator
of innovation we use as a robustness check is R&D expenditure (%GDP)7, which is
collected from OECD and UNESCO. We drop four countries due to missing values,
reducing our sample reduces to 46 countries. However, our threshold estimations re-
main robust even with the reduced sample size.
For controls in innovation regression, we include net inflow of foreign direct invest-
ment (%GDP) measuring the technology diffusion effect; population, which accounts
for possible scale effects in the process of innovation; mean years of schooling; GDP
per capita; and protection for intellectual property right. Regarding the growth
regression, the dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per capita and the vari-
ables of interest are innovation and financial development. We consider innovation as
regime dependent variable and take financial development as the threshold variable.
The controls include general government final consumption (%GDP), capital forma-
6This strategy can also be seen at [Cai et al., 2018]
7Some studies think that R&D indicator does not capture innovation very well because it belongs to input and
provides insufficient information on the output of R&D activities. Despite this, we think R&D indicator is still useful
as an alternative indicator to check the robustness of our results because it retains some predictive power about the
innovative output.
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tion (%GDP), CPI-based inflation rate (%), trade openness (%GDP), mean years of
schooling, and initial GDP per capita. To remove the influence of cyclical compo-
nents of data, we use five years non-overlapping averages. The final panel consists
of 50 countries from 1990 to 2016, among which, 28 are high income countries and
the rest are upper and lower middle income countries. Table (1.A7) provides the
definition, construction and source of each variable. Summary statistics are shown in
Table indicating a significant heterogeneity in innovation and financial development
across countries.
3. Results
As a starting point, we build an intuition about the relationship between financial de-
velopment and innovation by qualitatively splitting the sample into two groups: high
financial development countries and low financial development countries. Specifically,
the countries are ranked by the level of financial development in an ascending order.
Then we define the top half of the sample as countries with high level of financial
development, while the other half is defined as countries with low level of financial
development. Figure (1.1) shows that as financial development continues to expand,
its effect on innovation tends to decrease. This illustration seems to match the pre-
diction of existing theories, but possible non-linearities might exist via other sources.
Next, we present the empirical results.
3.1. Results for linear system-GMM
3.1.1. Financial development and innovation
Table (1.2) reports the basic results for equation (1). In this table, we use private
credit as a proxy for financial development and the percentage change in patent appli-
cation as dependent variable. We implement a two step system-GMM estimation for
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equation (1). Due to the downward bias in the computed standard errors of two-step
estimation, the Windmeijer correction is applied. In each regression, we take popu-
lation as an exogenous variable, while considering the rest as endogenous variables.
The full sample results show that the overall effect of private credit on innovation
is positive and significant. Population, FDI and GDP/capita exhibit a non-negative
but insignificant effect on innovation. In addition, schooling and protection for intel-
lectual property right have a negative but insignificant effect.
Next, we consider the effect of private credit change as the level of financial devel-
opment increases. We find that the effect of private credit on innovation for middle
income countries is higher than that of high income countries and that the overall
effect lies between 0.183 and 0.394. Moving to the low and high financial develop-
ment countries, we find a similar pattern that the effect in low financial development
countries is greater than that of high financial development countries. Again, the
overall effect lies between the two estimated effects. The p-value of the AR(2) test
and Hansen J-test are reported at the bottom of Table (2.2). The AR(2) test show
no significant correlation between the error term and the lagged dependent variable,
which indicates that the use of two lags for the dependent variable serve as valid
instruments. The Hansen test shows that the specifications do not suffer from over-
identification issues. This exercise is consistent with the intuition in Figure (1.1) and
confirms our hypothesis that “too much finance” would hurt innovative activities. In
Table (1.A1) of appendix, we provide robustness checks for regression (1) using other
indicators of financial development and we find a similar pattern as in Table (2.2).
We also provide a robustness check on how banking crisis affects rate of innovation,
the purpose of this exercise is to exclude the potential negative shock of banking crisis.
Under the 5 year average context, the dummy of banking crisis is taken as 1 if there
is at least one crisis during the five years interval, and zero if otherwise. The result
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in Table (1.A8) can be interpreted as the mid- or long-term effect of banking crisis
as we are using five year average values. We can see that banking crisis per se exerts
negative yet non-significant effect on innovation. The positive and significant effect
of financial development stays there. The coefficient on the interaction term between
financial development and crisis dummy is nonsignificant. This result suggests that
the diminishing effect of finance on innovation is independent of the external banking
crisis shock. More detailed information can be found in Appendix 2.
3.1.2. Financial development, innovation, and growth
This part studies how financial development affects the innovation-growth relation-
ship. Results in Tables (2.2) and (1.A1) show that innovation may be regime de-
pendent upon the level of financial development, since innovation is a determinant
factor for long-run growth, it is possible that the effect of innovation on growth is
conditional on the level of financial development. Our hypothesis is that higher level
of financial development hurts innovation and related investment in complementary
inventions and structure, reducing its effect on growth. We estimate equation (3) un-
der: i) full sample; ii) middle and high income groups; and iii) high and low level of
financial development groups. Table (1.3) provides the results using private credit by
banks and other financial institutions (%GDP) as a proxy for financial development
(similar to Table (1.2)), and patent per 100 billion USD as an indicator of innova-
tion. Table (1.3) shows that the overall effect of patent on growth is positive and
significant. When we split the sample into middle and high income countries, the
effect of innovation for middle income countries is larger than that of high income
countries. The same pattern appears when we split the sample into low and high
level of financial development countries. The effect is positive and significant for low
financial development countries, while it is positive and non-significant for high finan-
cial development countries. Also notice that the overall effect lies between the effects
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of the two subgroups.
In terms of the coefficients of other covariates, government consumption affects
negatively economic growth, which is consistent with the related literature. High in-
come and high financial development countries benefit from international trade, while
middle income and low financial development countries do not. Developing countries
are featured with unsound laws and regulations, less efficient financial market and low
level of human capital. These may impede its capacity to attract foreign investment
and to absorb the frontier technologies. Moreover, the negative coefficient of initial
GDP per capital captures the convergence effect. Table (1.3) also reports AR(2) and
Hansen J-test indicating valid specifications. We further check the robustness of our
estimations using alternative indicators of financial development and we find that the
results reported in Table (1.3) remain valid (see Table ()1.A2) in the appendix).
3.1.3. Interaction analysis
The results in the previous sub-sections deliver a signal that the effect of innovation
on growth may be heterogeneous across countries. Based on this observation, we
extend equation (2) to:
yit = ρyit−1 + αiinnovationit + γZit + ui + τt + eit (6)
where the parameter αi is country specific parameter and depends on financial devel-
opment
αi = α + βFDit (7)
As discussed in introduction, countries with higher level of financial development may
hurt innovation and its effect on growth. We therefore expect a negative sign on β.
Combining equations (6) and (7) we can get the form of equation (3).
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Table (1.4) reports the results of the interaction analysis. For every indicator of
financial development we find consistent results that the coefficient on interaction
term is negative and that the effect of patent is positive and significant. The average
marginal effect of patent on growth is α+β ∗FDit, since α > 0 and β < 0 the overall
effect of patent is a decreasing function of financial development. In Figure (1.A2) in
the appendix we simulate the average marginal effect of patent on growth for all the
indicators of financial development. Our findings suggest that the marginal effect is a
downward trend line and mainly positive. This is consistent with the results reported
in Table (1.3).
3.1.4. Credit expansion, Banking crisis, Innovation, and Growth
A number of recent empirical studies have documented a “too much finance” pat-
tern using both aggregrate and industrial level data. Major explanations to this
evidence include credit expansion, induced financial instability and economic volatil-
ity ([Rajan, 2006], [De la Torre et al., 2011]), as well as misallocation of resources
([Tobin, 1984], [Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015]). We find that, in our sample, bank-
ing crisis follows closely the credit expansions. Figure (1.A1) in the appendix shows
the evolution of private credit for U.S., UK, Japan, Malaysia, and China. For each
country, a banking crisis takes place when credit tends to expand. For example,
Malaysia experienced a banking crisis between 1997-1998. During this period the pri-
vate credit level is at the highest level in our sample. Table (1.5) shows the difference
in financial development between crisis and tranquil period. On average, the level of
private credit is significantly higher than in tranquil period. Banking crisis may af-
fect innovation performance and investments via several mechanisms ([Döner, 2017],
[OECD, 2012]). For example, a crisis causes a reduction in the demand for prod-
ucts dampening the incentives to innovate. In addition, firms may suffer from credit
constraints and difficulties in accessing financing during banking crisis causing a re-
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duction in riskier activities such as R&D expenditurers. This pro-cyclical pattern of
R&D and innovation has been observed over various business cycles and for a variety
of countries (e.g. [Comin and Gertler, 2006], [Francois and Lloyd-Ellis, 2008]).
The “diminishing effect” documented in Tables (1.3) and (1.4) may be attributable
to the potential negative effect of banking crisis on innovation. Therefore, we consider
the interaction between innovation and banking crisis in the following equation:
yit = ρyit−1 + αinnovationit + βBCit + δinnovationit ×BCit + γZit + ui + τt + eit
(8)
where BCit is the dummy for banking crisis for country i at year t. The value of
this dummy is 1 if there is a banking crisis at year t and 0 for tranquil periods. δ
measures the difference effect of finance on innovation between crisis and tranquil
period. [Arcand et al., 2015] show that economic volatility does not play a major
role in the vanishing effect of financial development. Thus, we expect that banking
crisis does not impose a significant impact on innovation-growth nexus. The results in
Table (1.6) show that banking crisis and patent have the expected signs. Regarding
the interaction term, we do not find a significant negative effect which means that
the vanishing effect of innovation on growth is not a result of banking crisis.
3.1.5. The European sovereign debt crisis and long run impact of financial crisis since
2009
The 2007-2008 financial crisis may have a long term negative impact on innovative
activities and innovation-led growth. The potential long-term negative effects on
innovation and growth, if any, can transmit through the negative effects on human
capital, future investment on R&D activities, technological leadership and public sup-
port systems for innovation ([OECD, 2012]).
In order to assess the heterogeneous impact of post financial crisis on innovation
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for different types of countries, we divide our sample into four groups: high income
countries, middle income countries, countries with high quality of governance and
countries with low quality of governance. We consider the quality of governance be-
cause the potential negative effect on innovation may depend on the soundness of the
quality of governance.8 We use the index of quality of governance (QOG), proposed
by [Teorell et al., 2018], to measure the quality of government. A country is consid-
ered as high QOG if the index is above the 50th percentile of all countries.
Panel A of Table (1.7) provides a brief summary of the innovation resilience after
the 2007-2008 financial crisis. To assess how financial crisis affects the innovation in
the long run, we construct three indicators to measure the innovation recovery after
the financial crisis. The first indicator is called Sinking Ratio, which is defined as
the ratio of countries whose innovation level does not recover to its pre-crisis level
through the whole post financial crisis period examined in our sample. We use the
average level of innovation in year 2005 and 2006 as the pre-crisis level of innovation.
Meanwhile, year 2009 is set as the initial year after the financial crisis. The sinking
ratio shows that 39.2% of high income countries never recover to its pre-crisis level
of innovation between 2009-2016. Similarly, 38.4% of high QOG countries do not
fully recover to its pre-crisis level of innovation. However, the sinking ratio is lower
for middle income and low QOG countries. Next, we consider how long does it take
for a country to recover from crisis. The average years of recovery is defined as the
average years needed to return to pre-crisis level for those recovered countries. We
find that middle income and low QOG countries take longer to recover to pre-crisis
level than that of high income and high QOG countries. The average years needed
8The literature on the effect of Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision (BCP) show that better
supervisory governance and supervisory unification were generating a positive impact on financial sector stability and
banking soundness pre-2008 financial crisis. However, these conclusions do not hold when the period examined covers
the 2007-2008 financial crisis. [Quintyn et al., 2011] find a negative relationship between supervisory governance and
economic resilience using a panel of 100 countries. Countries with a solid supervisory governance system hurt more
during the 2007-2008 crisis. If this evidence is reliable, then one possible explanation is that innovation recovers slowly
or is unable to return to pre-crisis level for countries with high quality of governance.
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to recover for high income and high QOG countries is between 0.43 and 0.5, however,
this time is around 1.4 for middle income and low QOG countries. We also take a
look at the years needed for the first positive growth of innovation after crisis, which
is defined as the average years of first turning point. We find that for each of the four
groups, countries tend to recover in a quarter after 2009. Overall, middle income and
low QOG countries take longer to recover to pre-crisis innovation level, but the sink-
ing ratio is lower than that of high income and high QOG countries. This indicates
that the self-healing ability after crisis in middle income and low QOG countries is
stronger. These facts are consistent with the pattern in [Quintyn et al., 2011].
The financial crisis may have a significant role on the ongoing European sovereign
debt crisis (ESDC) started in late 2009 and early 2010 through international finan-
cial linkages, but ESDC should not be simply taken as the consequence of the recent
financial crisis. Many factors contribute to the ESDC.9 In our sample, there are 17
European countries, which are among the high income countries. Although 12 out of
17 countries tend to recover to its pre-crisis level of innovation very quickly, most of
these European countries are affected during the ESDC. To measure how ESDC may
affect countries’ innovation after 2010,10 we construct a simple indicator measuring
the ratio of countries with negative average growth rate of innovation since 2010. As
shown in row 4 of panel A in Table (1.7), 67.86% of high income countries experience
negative growth of innovation, while this figure is 50% for middle income countries.
For high QOG countries, 69.23% of them show negative growth rate of innovation.
This indicator is 50% for low QOG countries. Regarding the European countries in
our sample, 14 out of 17 show a negative trend in innovation during this course. Over
9For example, the globalization of finance; easy credit conditions during 2002-2008 period that encouraged high-risk
lending and borrowing practices; international trade imbalance; the inaccordance between unified Euro Zone monetary
policy and independent fiscal policy of individual sovereign country; and possibly the inability of the macroeconomic
model employed by European Central Bank
10Notice that, we cannot attribute a country’s declination of innovation after 2010 simply to the impact of ESDC,
for example, we find that Argentina and Brazil show a negative trend. This, however, could be a compound effect of
both long-run effect of financial crisis and other domestic factors.
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the same period, the level of financial development, as shown in panel B of Table
(1.7), is higher for high income and high QOG countries.
Table (1.8) provides a test on the impact of post financial crisis and ongoing Eu-
ropean sovereign debt crisis on innovation. We define the dummy LC = 1 for the
years after 2009 and LC = 0 if otherwise. The interaction term between financial
development and LC is negative. This indicates that the ongoing European sovereign
debt crisis and post financial crisis impose a significant negative effect on innovation.
Combining these facts, it is possible that the diminishing effect of finance on
innovation-led growth is caused by the ongoing ESDC and long run negative effect
of financial crisis. To check the robustness of our results, we delete the sample after
2010 to rule out the influence of post financial crisis and European Debt Crisis. The
results in Table (1.9) use private credit as indicator of financial development11 and
show that the pattern is quite similar to that of the full sample. In the growth re-
gression, the overall effect of patent is positive and higher for middle income and low
level of financial development countries. This shows that the non-linearity between
finance, innovation and growth is robust and independent of the financial crisis and
European sovereign debt crisis.
3.1.6. Brief summary
The results illustrated in this sub-section reveal the existence of possible non-linearity
between financial development, innovation and growth. Countries with higher level
of financial development tend to have a lower rate of innovation and growth. The
results are robust under a series of robustness checks. However, in the above analysis
we slpit our sample using qualitative characteristics and the threshold at which the
non-linearity occurs is not rigorously estimated. To quantitatively measure whether
there is a threshold for the finance-innovation-growth nexus, we use a dynamic panel
11We also use other indicators of financial development for robustness check, and the results are similar.
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threshold methodology developed by [Seo and Shin, 2016].
3.2. Dynamic Panel Threshold Result
[Seo and Shin, 2016]’s model extends [Hansen, 1999] and [Caner and Hansen, 2004]
static panel threshold model and [Kremer et al., 2013] dynamic panel threshold model
by allowing for the transitional variable and other covariates to be endogenous and
for unobserved individual heterogeneity. To estimate the coefficients they propose
a First Difference GMM (FD-GMM) transformation. This algorithm relaxes the
exogeneity assumption of regressors and threshold variable and guarantees that the
estimators follow normal distribution asymptotically, which validates the use of Wald
test for standard statistical inference on threshold and other parameters. The GMM
estimators are obtained through a two-step procedure.12
3.2.1. Innovation regression
In innovation regression, equation (4), we consider financial development as a thresh-
old variable as well as a regime dependent variable. Financial development could be
endogenous due to omitted variables and due to the reverse causality between techno-
logical progress and financial services. Technology changes relating to telecommuni-
cations and data processing have greatly spurred financial innovations and services in
commercial banking that have facilitated secondary markets for retail loans, such as
credit card debt and mortgages. For example, the introduction of Automated Teller
Machines (ATMs), Debit Cards, Online Banking and Prepaid Cards have significantly
enhanced the banking account access and amount of credits ([Frame et al., 2014]). It
is hence necessary to take the endogeneity issue of financial development into account.
Previous panel threshold methods cannot handle the endogeneity issue of the thresh-
old variable and other covariates. [Seo and Shin, 2016]’s model construct the set of
12For details see [Seo and Shin, 2016]
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instrumental variables using the lagged dependent variable, the threshold variable
and other covariates.
Table (1.10) shows the results for every indicator of financial development using
dynamic panel threshold method. For private credit in column (1), the effect of FD
is positive and significant in the lower regime, while it becomes insignificant in the
upper regime. The estimated threshold value of banking credit is 48% and the lin-
earity test indicates an overall significant non-linear relationship. In addition, the
over-identification test (J-test) indicates no over-identification issues. Moving from
column (2) to (4), we find consistent results with that of private credit and with
estimated threshold values at around 50%.
3.2.2. Growth regression
In growth regression, equation (5), we consider the financial development as the
threshold variable and innovation as the regime dependent variable. The endogeneity
role of financial development in the finance-growth relationship is undetermined. Ev-
idences from country cross-section, time series and panel data studies provide mixed
signals on the causality between financial development and growth. Using cross sec-
tional data, [King and Levine, 1993a], [Levine et al., 2000a] and [Levine et al., 2003]
show evidence of one-way causation, that financial development leads to growth. Sub-
sequent studies cast doubts on the cross-section country evidences. Cross-sectional
data may cause spurious correlation arising from nonstationarity. To overcome this
potential issue, [Demetriades and Hussein, 1996] use time series data for 16 countries
and conduct cointegration test, they find evidence of bi-directionality and even evi-
dence of reverse causality. Also, they find that the causal relationship between finan-
cial development and growth is country-specific. However, time series evidence may
also be unreliable due to the short time span of data. A good option may be the use of
panel data. Using panel data for ten developing countries [Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004]
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apply a panel cointegration analysis and find evidence in support of the cross-section
country studies. [Calderón and Liu, 2003] use a panel of 105 countries from 1960 to
1994 and find that, in general, financial development leads to growth. However, the
effect is heterogeneous across countries and larger in developing countries. Moreover,
they find that Granger causality test shows a bi-directional causality between finan-
cial development and growth.
In sum, the above evidence reveal the possibility of reverse causality between fi-
nancial development and growth. This leads us to consider the threshold variable
(the indicator of financial development) as endogenous. Regarding the endogeneity
issue of other covariates, innovation may also be endogenously determined by eco-
nomic development. High income countries typically invest more in R&D activities
and hence promote innovation. Government spending, trade, inflation, schooling and
investment may also be endogenous due to reverse causality and omitted variable
issues. To account for the endogeneity issues, we use the lagged threshold variable,
regime dependent variable, dependent variable and other covariates as instruments.
Table (1.11) summarizes the basic results of the dynamic panel threshold regression
for every financial development indicator, estimating equation (5). Column 1 shows
the results from the use of private credit as financial development indicator. The co-
efficient of patent is positive and significant for the lower regime, while it is negative
at the upper regime. The estimated threshold value is 58.4% of GDP. The p-value
of the linearity test shows a significant non-linearity between the two regimes. Us-
ing alternative indicators of financial development, we obtain similar results, except
for liquidity. Specifically, banking credit and domestic credit generate a threshold
value of 58.5% and 57.7%, respectively. However, for liquidity liability both lower
and upper regime show negative effect, while the estimated threshold is 136.7%. One
possible reason for the high estimated threshold value for liquidity liability is that
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the tail of liquidity density is longer than the others. The Kernel density of the four
indicators are plotted in Figure (1.A3) in the appendix. Obviously, the density of
liquidity liability is significantly right-skewed, which may explain the relatively larger
threshold value.
3.2.3. Robustness checks
As a robustness check we re-examine our threshold estimations taking into account the
R&D spending as an alternative indicator of innovation. Tables (1.A3) and (1.A4)
report the innovation and growth threshold estimations, respectively. The results
indicate that the key non-linear relationship and estimated threshold values, reported
in the previous subsections, remain consistent.
We also provide an additional robustness check taking into account the utility
models, as an additional indicator of innovation. In this case we re-estimate the results
for the growth threshold equation (see Table (1.A5)) and we find that the estimated
threshold remains around the level of 60% as a share of GDP, which is consistent with
the results we obtained using patents (see Table (1.11)) and the results we obtained
using R&D spending (see Table (1.A4)). Therefore, these robustness checks indicate
the validity and consistency of our baseline results.
3.2.4. Discussion on the smaller threshold level
Most of the estimated threshold values in finance-growth literature are between 53%
and 100%. For example [Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012] and [Arcand et al., 2015]
estimate a threshold of around 100%, [Masten et al., 2008] between 53% and 70%,
[Law and Singh, 2014] at 88%, and [Samargandi et al., 2015] at 91%. In our sample,
the estimated threshold values are at about 60%. While this value is towards the
smaller value of the range reported in the related literature, we argue that this is
not due to the sample selection issue, rather the econometric method employed and
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the potential impact of financial integration across Europe and the world. As a com-
parision, we apply the quadratic regression by including the square term of financial
development indicators and the [Kremer et al., 2013]’s panel threshold model to our
current sample. To find out the optimal value, the quadratic regression use Lind and
Mehlum U-shape test to decide whether the nonlinear effect exists or not and where
the threshold value lies. All the quadratic regressions are estimated using system-
GMM. [Kremer et al., 2013]’s panel threshold model includes lagged dependent vari-
able as the only instrument variable, without taking into account the endogeneity
of threshold variable, regime dependent variable, and other covariates. The results
in table (1.A6) show that both methods give very large threshold values, which is
consistent with the threshold documented in previous studies. In this sense, the large
threshold value documented in previous studies may be biased.
In addition, our sample contains 17 European countries from 1990 to 2016. There-
fore, our threshold value cannot be completely attributed to the differences in the
econometric tools, but it also relates to financial integration across European coun-
tries and the rest of the world. Financial integration may enhance the positive effect
of financial development on innovation and growth, thus may lead to a smaller thresh-
old value of financial development. One direct evidence is from [Masten et al., 2008],
where using data from European countries they document a credit-to-GDP threshold
between 53-70%, which is similar to our work.
In Table (1.12) we provide an additional test by re-estimating equation (5) con-
sidering the financial development as both the threshold variable and the regime de-
pendent variable. This way we test the threshold effect between finance and growth.
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Therefore, equation (5) becomes:
yit = ρyit−1 + βLFDit ∗ I(FDit ≤ γ) + βHFDit ∗ I(FDit > γ) + θZit + ui + τt + eit
(9)
The results indicate an estimated threshold value of about 60%, which is very close
with the results from the previous sub-section presented in Tables (1.11) and (1.A3).
This shows that the results we obtained in the previous sub-section, where we allowed
for innovation to switch according to the financial indicator, remain valid even if we
do not consider innovation as a regime dependent variable. Therefore, innovation
does not affect significantly the estimated threshold of financial development, but it
seems to be significantly affected by the level of financial development.
3.2.5. Theoretical explanation
Evidences in Tables (1.10), (1.11), and (1.12) reveal two important economic im-
plications. First, we show that financial development imposes diminishing effect on
rate of innovation, such a diminishing effect may slow down economic growth. In
this sense, our findings provide a channel through which “too much finance” may
harm growth. There may exist three channels through which this diminishing ef-
fect works. First, financial development reduces the rate of innovation and thus the
productivity growth. In [Rajan and Zingales, 1998], they show that financial develop-
ment causes the productivity growth in a unidirectional way. [Levine et al., 1998] also
shows that productivity growth is the main channel linking financial development to
growth. These studies indicate productivity growth as a major channel through which
financial development affects growth. Therefore, the negative effect of financial devel-
opment on growth may be attributed to its potential negative effect on productivity
growth. Follow this logic, [Aghion et al., 2018] has documented an inverted U-shaped
relationship between financial development and productivity growth. We show explic-
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itly that the diminishing effect of financial development on rate of innovation could
be the source of inverted U-shape relationship between financial development and
productivity growth. In this sense, we close the FD-innovation-productivity-growth
chain. Second, FD may reduce both the quantity and quality of innovation. This also
causes a decline in productivity growth and aggregate growth. Finally, high level of
financial development induces volatility in firm sales growth ([Wang and Wen, 2009]),
signalling a downward expectation on the returns of investment. This may reduce the
investment in risky projects such as R&D activities. Lower R&D expenditure may
slow down the rate of innovation output, and thus the innovation-led growth.
The second implication is that financial development may make innovations less
effective in promoting economic growth. In other words, given a unit increase in
innovation, the contribution of innovation is smaller in countries with higher level of
financial development. Why? We think that an innovation will not be effective in pro-
moting productivity and aggregate growth until necessary complementary inventions
and follow-up investment in productive capital occurs. As credit market develops,
bank and firm develop close ties. This close firm-bank ties may facilitate firms to ac-
cess credit, but it may also prevent firms from involving risky projects such as R&D
activities ([Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998]), causing less productive but more pledgeable
projects to be easily financed ([Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015]). The results in table
(1.A3) also confirm this argument. The relatively less investment of productive capital
may prolong the implementation and restructuring lags and reduce the contribution
of innovation on productivity and economic growth ([Gordon, 2018]).
3.2.6. Financial development and productivity growth slowdown
The diminishing effect of financial development on innovation and growth lead us to
think about the possibility that whether the expansionary financial sector is responsi-
ble for the productivity growth slowdown in the U.S. and other developed economies
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started the early 2000s. For expository convenience, Figure (1.A4) and Table (1.A8)
show the annual total factor productivity growth rate for the G7 group from 1985 to
2017. The U.S. TFP growth rate has seen an increase from 0.732% in the 1980s to
1.623% around 2004, then it goes down after 2004 even before the financial crisis. A
similar pattern can be found in other G7 countries, with Italy as an exception, whose
TFP growth rate keeps declining since the mid-1980s. We can also see a significant
drop in the TFP growth rate between 2007-2008, then a recovery to a level of less
than 1%. Since the decline already began well before the financial crisis, it is less
likely that the crisis-related explanation is an almighty candidate.
Several explanations have emerged to account for the slowdown in productiv-
ity growth in the U.S. and other developed countries. For example, ”The mis-
measurement hypothesis”([Griliches, 1994] and [Byrne et al., 2018])13, weak business
dynamism([Decker et al., 2016], [De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017], and [Bijnens, 2018]),
low interest rate([Gopinath et al., 2017] and [Liu et al., 2019]). The latter two expla-
nations lead to the same end that it is the rise in industry concentration(or falling
in the competition) and higher markups that lead to lower productivity growth be-
cause lower financial constraints and real interest rates have made it harder for high-
productivity firms to crowd out the least efficient ones. Financial development closely
relates to credit constraints, capital abundance, and interest rate, accordingly, it is
likely that financial development serves as a deep-rooted explanation to the produc-
tivity growth decline of developed economies since the 1980s.
4. Conclusions
This paper has empirically tested the hypothesis that an expansion in financial sector
would hurt innovation and innovation-led growth, using a panel of 50 countries over
13[Brynjolfsson et al., 2018] admitted that we cannot completely exclude the possibility of mismeasurement issue,
but it is not a major force that drags the productivity growth over the past decade. Similar viewpoint can also be
found in [Sichel, 1997] and [Sichel, 2019]
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1990-2016. The results from a linear system-GMM shows that countries with higher
level of financial development are associated with a relatively low rate of innova-
tion. Furthermore, this vanishing effect between finance and innovation would finally
transmit to innovation-led growth. We find that the positive effect of innovation on
growth is smaller or even insignificant for countries with developed financial sector.
These conclusions are robust to the banking crisis, the long run effect of 2007-2008
financial crisis, the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis and alternative indicators
of financial development and innovation. To precisely estimate the threshold value
at which the vanishing effect starts, a dynamic panel threshold model is employed.
We find that, for our sample of countries, innovation starts to have an insignificant
effect on output growth when private credit reaches the level of around 60% of GDP.
Finally, we have shown that our threshold value is not driven by our sample size and
selection but the difference in the tools employed in our work, compared to the re-
lated literature, as well as the ongoing regional and international financial integration
process.
This current work can be extended in several ways. First, the currently employed
innovation indicator does not reflect the full picture of innovation, future work would
be to construct alternative indicators. A potential candidate would be the research
quotient(RQ), which measures the research efficiency of R&D. The RQ is considered
a better measurement of innovation as it is output- and market-oriented and well
captures the marginal contribution of R&D expenditure by controlling for the other
factors that affect sales revenue. The conventional output-based measurement of in-
novation such as patent counts and patent citation suffer from several issues. For
example, nearly 50% of firms do not apply for patent protection, that is, the patent
data cannot capture the precise output of R&D. The patent citation data suffer from
the truncation issue, to properly use it, one needs to adjust it using the estimated
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citation lag metric. Besides, patent as an outcome of R&D may not necessarily bring
practical commercial profits. Accordingly, using patent-based innovation measures
may lead to bias conclusions as well as the wrong question.
Second, the effect of financial development on innovation may be sector-specific.
For example, the Medical industry R&D may be more reliant on the cost/availability
of credit than the Software industry. It is interesting to decompose innovation
(patents) by sector and examine how finance affects each and whether passthrough
to growth differs by sector of innovation. The disaggregated data can also well ac-
count for the heterogeneity and endogeneity issue. Accordingly, it is advisable to
use the industrial and firm-level data to re-examine the above hypothesis. Another
development would be to construct homogeneous groups using the convergence club
technique.
Third, the current analysis framework can be extended to the equity market in-
stead of limiting it to the credit market. the behavior of the stock market may be
different from the credit one. We think that there will generate new and comprehen-
sive insights into this issue.
Last but not least, it is interesting to explore how the diminishing effect of FD on
innovation and growth has played a role in the convergence between poor and rich
economies. If too much finance promotes innovation more efficient in countries with
lower FD, then countries with an optimal level of FD may catch up with countries
with a higher level of FD.
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CHAPTER II
THE NONLINEAR EFFECT OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT ON
INNOVATION: THE ROLE OF MARKET STRUCTURE
1. Introduction
This paper studies the nonlinear effect of financial development on innovation. Under-
standing how financial development affects innovation is important in both theoreti-
cal and practical regards. Traditional thoughts on the finance-innovation nexus think
that financial development facilitates innovation by relaxing the constraints of financ-
ing for innovative activities such as R&D. Further, financial development affects eco-
nomic growth mainly through its effects on productivity([Rajan and Zingales, 1998]).
So theoretically understanding how financial development affects innovation could
shed light on the mechanism between finance-growth nexus. In practice, whether
financial development promotes innovation may determine the government’s policy
preference for innovation. For example, if the positive effect holds in any situation,
then policies and regulations that promote financial market development may be fa-
vored compared to the R&D subsidies.
Studies such as [Hsu et al., 2014] has examined the effect of financial development
on innovation, most of these findings in this field support the positive monotonic re-
lationship. However, a few papers have shown that more finance may negatively
affect innovation due to the induced macro-volatility([Morales, 2003]), ”crowding
out effect”([Tobin, 1984], [Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015], [Borio et al., 2016], and
[Boustanifar et al., 2018]), and ”trade-off effect”([Aghion et al., 2019]).
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It is hence reasonable to hypothesize that as the financial sector continues to ex-
pand, financial development imposes a nonlinear effect on innovative activities, with a
positive effect before a certain threshold level and a negative effect post the threshold
value.
A few existing papers have examined the nonlinearity between financial develop-
ment and innovation using country-level data. For example, [Law et al., 2018] find
financial development exerts a negative effect on innovation around the threshold
value of 100%. The method used to detect nonlinear effect is by including the square
term of indicators of financial development. Another paper by [Zhu et al., 2020] has
shown that credit market expansion exerts a diminishing effect on innovation. This
paper employs a novel dynamic panel threshold model and finds a threshold value
between 50% and 60%, which are smaller than the value documented in previous
finance-growth literatures.
Several issues emerge in the previous literature on the nonlinear effect of financial
development on innovative activities. First, the link between the financial sector and
innovation may be sector-specific. For example, Medical R&D may be more reliant
on the cost or availability of credit than the software industry. Previous studies using
country-level data assigns equal weight on the innovation(measured by patent counts)
fail to capture the sector-specific effects. Second, the financial indicators used in the
previous works fail to capture the overall picture of a countrys financial development.
An overall picture of financial development includes development in both equity and
credit market and financial institutions. In Law and [Zhu et al., 2020], they only fo-
cus on the credit market. Therefore, the conclusion may not hold if considering a
comprehensive measurement of financial development. Third, The measure of inno-
vation such as patent counts and citations each patent received after filing may not
precisely reflect the innovation output of firms, because nearly 50% of firms with R&D
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activities do not filing a patent due to several considerations([Cooper et al., 2015]).
Last but not least, the endogeneity of financial development. Law(2018) uses GMM
to account for the endogeneity issue. The spirit of the dynamic panel threshold model
used in [Zhu et al., 2020] is similar to GMM because it uses the lagged value of both
threshold and regime dependent variables as instrumental variables. Although GMM
could solve the endogeneity issue in partial, it suffers from the sensitivity and large
instrument issue. A economic-intuitive method instead of the technique-oriented IV
is desired to control for it.
In this paper, using a new data set consisting of a large volume of firms from both
developing and developed countries, we attempt to provide novel and thorough empir-
ical examinations regarding the potential nonlinear effect of financial development on
innovation. In particular, we focus on the innovative activities in the Manufacturing
sector. We first identify how financial development affects innovation nonlinearly at
the industrial level, then we focus on the channels through which this channel works.
Specifically, we seek to answer the following:
• Will there be any negative or diminishing effect as the financial sector expands?
• Are the effects of the equity market and credit market different? And are there
any sector-specific effects?
• What could be the potential channel through which the negative or diminishing
effect takes place? if any.
• And, will the effect of financial development on innovation differ between devel-
oped and emerging economies?
To answer these questions, we first construct cross country industry-level data from
the Worldscope Fundamentals Annual. Second, we capture the full picture of finan-
cial development by using multi-dimension indicators. The indicators include both
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the credit and equity markets. We also use the financial development index filed by
IMF([Svirydzenka, 2016]). Third, to overcome the shortcomings of current measures
of innovation, we construct a unique cross country Research Quotient(RQ) database
consists of 48 countries between 1989-2017. The RQ is defined as the firm-specific
output elasticity of R&D. it has several advantages over the traditional innovation
measures such as patent count, patent citation, R&D input and TFP(See discus-
sions in [Cooper et al., 2015]). Fourth, we twist the RZ specification a little bit to
account for the endogeneity of financial development. In this paper, we extend the
RZ index([Rajan and Zingales, 1998]) by constructing the External Financing Depen-
dence(EFD) index for each country. This way allows us to account for the hetero-
geneity of EFD for different industries across different nations. Lastly, the industrial
level data allows us to examine the sector-specific effect. We consider the innovative
activities in the manufacturing sector and divide the manufacturing sector into high
tech and non-high tech sectors. We examine the heterogeneous effects of financial
development on innovative activities across sectors.
In the first section, we show that a high level of financial development has a di-
minishing effect on innovative activities. We use the financial development indexes,
which are comprehensive indicators that synthesize both the development in financial
markets and financial institutions, as proxies for the overall financial development.
The innovation of Industries that rely heavily on external financing benefits more
when financial development is lower than a certain level, however, this positive ef-
fect diminishes as the level of financial development exceeds that threshold. When
decomposing the financial markets into credit markets and equity markets, we find
differentiated behavior between these two types of financial markets. Specifically,
the diminishing effects hold for the credit markets, while in the equity market, more
finance is ”always better”.
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In the second section, we conduct several robustness checks. First, we aggregate
the industrial level patent counts and forward citation weighted patent counts as
alternative indicators of innovation by merging firm-level data set from Compustat
North America Fundamentals Annual, Compustat Global Fundamentals Annual, and
USPTO. We find stable patterns. Second, we consider whether the diminishing effects
are sector-specific. We classify the manufacturing sector into two sub-sectors: high
technology manufacturing industry(SIC 35 and 36) and non-high technology manu-
facturing industry. The results indicate that the innovative activities of the high tech
industry are more likely to be affected by the equity market, and exhibit inverted-U
shape between the equity market and innovation. While the credit markets play a
major role in the non-high tech sectors and impose a diminishing effect on innovation.
Despite the different roles, each market shows an inverted-U effect on innovation in its
domain. Third, we use legal rules as instrumental variables to check the robustness
and find consistent results.
After establishing the facts, we turn to the potential channel through which fi-
nancial development affects innovation in a nonlinear manner. [Aghion et al., 2005a]
finds that there exists an inverted-U shape between market structure, as measured by
the degree of competition, and the innovative activities. In [Liu et al., 2019], lower
interest rates enhance the innovation incentives of technological leaders in the various
sectors of the economy. This, in turn, increases the average technological gap between
leaders and followers, and consequently discourages innovation by followers, causing
a rising of market concentration. Because financial development reduces the credit
constraints mainly by lowering the interest rate, we hypothesize that financial devel-
opment affects innovation through its nonlinear effect on market structure. We find
that the degree of competition becomes weak as the level of financial development
increases in industries rely heavily on external financing. Further, we show consis-
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tently that the marginal effect of competition on innovation decreases with the level
of financial development.
Realizing that countries with different institutions or stages of development may
carry different financing strategies toward the innovation, thus the effects may be
heterogeneous, we categorize the country into High-Income Countries and Non-High
Income Countries based on the World Bank Country Classification System14. We
find striking results. Specifically, the high income and non-high income countries
that share a similar threshold range exhibit opposite effects. For each indicator of
financial development employed in our paper, the diminishing effect of financial de-
velopment on innovation occurs only in high-income countries. In Non-high income
countries, financial development exhibits accelerating effects or kick-in effects. We
provide an explanation for this fact. Basically, it relates to the financial development,
types of innovation, and market competition. More details will be provided in section
8.
Together, our results not only identify the nonlinear effect of financial development
on innovation but also provide novel evidences on the multi-dimensional picture of
the effects. While there have been several studies on the nonlinear relationship be-
tween finance and innovation, our findings differ from the earlier studies in that we
use unique database and novel indicators of innovation, and find differential effects
between credit and equity markets, we are also able to identify an explicit channel,
which provides a micro-based perspective to understand the transmission pipeline
of finance-growth nexus. Lastly, we find heterogeneous effects across sectors and
development stages. This finding is important in terms of the cross country study
in this field and policy-making for different countries. We also provide an untested
14The WB Country Classification System originally divides countries into four groups: High income, Upper Middle
income, Lower Middle income, and low income. The number of countries in the Lower Middle and Low-income group
is too small that the observation is not sufficient. Therefore, we combine the last three categories into one group: the
Non-high income countries.
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explanation for future study.
In the rest of the paper, Section 2 reviews related literature and develops our major
research hypotheses, Section 3 and 4 presents the major empirical strategies, data,
and the detailed procedures on how the indicators are constructed, we present and
discuss our main results in Section 5 and 6, Section 7 discusses the potential channels.
Section 8 explores the heterogeneous effects across the stage of country development.
Section 9 concludes.
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
In this section, we briefly review the literature relevant to our study. Previous
studies such as [Xiao and Zhao, 2012], [Brown et al., 2013], [Hsu et al., 2014], and
[Acharya and Xu, 2017] have shown that equity and credit market development might
impose differential effect on innovation. Given this, we split the reviews into three
sections. The first part reviews the studies on the credit market and innovation,
then reviews how equity market development affect innovation, finally, we propose a
hypothesis on the overall effect of financial development on innovation.
2.1. Credit Markets and Innovation
R&D activities are difficult to finance in a competitive market environment due to
both its longer than average maturity horizon and to its high budget requirements.
As the financial market develops, the credit constraints of innovative activities are
likely to relax and the risks associated with R&D can be diversified. Therefore, firms
have more incentives to increase the R&D investment since the potential returns are
high. [King and Levine, 1993b] provide country-level evidence and verify this channel.
[Hsu et al., 2014] use industry-level data and find a monotonic positive relationship
between financial development and innovation. Evidences from the firm-level data
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also confirm this conventional wisdom([Aghion et al., 2012], [Brown et al., 2009], and
[Amore et al., 2013]).
Despite the optimists, several theoretical and empirical studies raised the concern
of possible crowding-out effects of financial development on innovation. [Tobin, 1984]
raised the concerns that too many financial activities may misallocate resources, both
physical and human capital, from the production sector to less productive finan-
cial sector. [Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015] and [Borio et al., 2016] elaborate this
idea by showing that less productive but more pledgeable projects are easily be
financed during financial sector expansions. When credit inflates, workers, espe-
cially the talented STEM workers, are lured into low productivity gains sectors such
as the financial sector due to high finance compensation([Axelson and Bond, 2015],
[Boustanifar et al., 2018], and [Célérier and Vallée, 2019]). Both channels hurt real
sectors by reducing the innovation capacity.
There may also exist a trade-off effect of financial development on innovation.
Evidence from firm-level, such as [Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998], shows that close firm-
bank ties may facilitate firms to access credit, but it may also prevent firms from
involving risky and high return projects such as R&D activities. [Morales, 2003]
introduces the financial sector in an endogenous growth model and shows that fi-
nancial activity may have two opposite external effects on research productivity. On
one hand, the positive effect of financial activity spill over to other sectors of the
economy and promote productivity, On the other hand, however, this positive ex-
ternality would induce creative destruction process and discourage the incentives of
incumbent to invest in R&D. Inspired by the works of [Klette and Kortum, 2004] and
[Akcigit and Kerr, 2018], [Aghion et al., 2019] think that financial development may
result in two competing effects. On the one hand, potentially good innovators may
face fewer financing constraints to enter the market due to the development of the
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financial market, which in turn is beneficial to aggregate innovation and growth. On
the other hand, fewer credit constraints may make it easier for less efficient incumbent
firms to remain on the market and prevent more efficient innovators from entering
the market. This, in turn, may be harmful to aggregate innovation and growth. As
the financial sector continues to expand in the modern economy, credit constraints
are now not a major concern for many firms, it is even uncertain whether the overall
effect of financial development on innovation is monotonic. Collectively, the above
discussion leads to our first research hypothesis
H1:Credit market development has a positive but diminishing effect on innovation.
2.2. Equity Market Development and Innovation
The studies on the stock market affects firm innovation is mixed. Stock markets dif-
fer from the debt markets in that it provides different mechanisms and channels for
fundraising, and thus may generate differential effects on innovative activities. Many
studies in this area support the idea that the stock market promotes firm innovation.
One relevant study by [Moshirian et al., 2018] shows that industries with higher in-
novation intensity experience a higher level of innovation output given a stock market
liberalization shock. Using a matched Chinese firm-level data, [He et al., 2017] shown
that after an IPO, firms’ innovation, both quantity and quality, improves. A cross-
country study by [Xiao and Zhao, 2012] documented that stock market development
significantly enhances firm innovation, using World Bank survey of over 28,000 firms
from 46 countries.
Some other studies think that the stock market may inhibit innovation. [Bernstein, 2015]
compared firms that went public with similar firms that stayed private and found no
change in the scale of innovation but a substantial decline of approximately 40 per-
cent in innovation novelty when companies went public. The reason, as suggested
by the author, is that the transition to public equity markets leads firms to reposi-
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tion their R&D investments toward more conventional and safer projects. Similarly,
[Wies and Moorman, 2015] found that companies that go public produce more inno-
vations than before but that those innovations are less bold. because going public
increases capital which allows more innovations but it introduces “myopic incentives
and disclosure requirements” which can inhibit riskier innovation. Another study by
[Acharya and Xu, 2017] also shows that public firms in external finance dependent
industries are more likely to generate patents of higher quantity as well as quality.
Notice that these two research are country-specific as they were built in the context
of U.S. private and public firms. A cross country study by [Brown et al., 2013] com-
pared the effect of equity financing and debt financing on innovation. They found
that better access to stock market financing is particularly important for investment
in research and development (R&D), and credit market access is much less important
than stock market access for R&D investment because of the shortcomings of debt for
funding R&D. Despite the fact that we have found evidence showing the possibility
of a positive and negative effect of stock market development on firm innovation, a
diminishing effect is possible, but it is still hard to fix the idea of whether excessive
equity financing is good or bad to innovation as a whole. It is likely that the positive
effect of stock market development on innovation still dominates, and it is also pos-
sible that the effect may vary according to the dimensions of financial development.
For example, stock market depth, accessibility, and efficiency may affect innovation
differently. Thus, we have
H2: Equity market development may have a diminishing effect as it continues to
expand, but it also depends upon the characteristics of equity markets .
2.3. Financial development and innovation
As stated above, most of the studies on the effect of financial development on inno-
vation or productivity focus separately on either the credit market or equity market.
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To fully understand the effect, a synthesis of both the equity market and the credit
market is desired. In [Hsu et al., 2014], they define the overall level of financial de-
velopment as the sum of a country’s stock market capitalization plus domestic credit
provided by the banking sector. Despite the fact that both sources of financing will be
primarily used for investment relevant activities, this simple lump sum of the depth
of two markets fails to distinguish the function of each market, thus may make the
aggregation not be feasible. Besides, the overall financial development defined in their
paper is only about the depth dimension of financial development, it does not involve
efficiency and accessibility of financial development. In this paper, we will use a new
set of index developed by [Svirydzenka, 2016]. This set of index provides compre-
hensive measures of financial development from different dimensions. More details
will be given in the following section. Theoretically, it is hard to predict how overall
financial development affects the innovation, because it depends on the share of each
component, ways of funds raising, and its ways of use. But based on the above two
hypothesis, we predict that the overall effect of financial development aligns with the
effect of credit and equity market, that is
H3: The overall effect of financial development on innovation is diminishing.
3. Empirical Strategy
3.1. Basic Identifications
To establish the intuition about the possible nonlinear effect of financial development
on innovation, we first adopt a simple quadratic form regression
RQc,i,t = σ0 + αvalue addc,i,t−1 + βFDc,t−1 + γFD
2
c,t−1 + δXc,i,t + ηc,t + µi + εc,i,t
(10)
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whereRQc,i,t is our proxy for innovation for country c, industry i at year t. value addc,i,t−1
is the value-added of industry i in country c at time t− 1. FDc,t−1 and FD2c,t−1 are
the original and quadratic form of indicators of financial development for country
c at year t − 1, respectively15. To capture the overall picture of FD, we consider
both the development of equity and credit market. For each category, we use three
dimensions trying to exhaust the different characteristics of each market. A detailed
description of each indicator will be given in the next section. Xc,i,. is the industrial
control variables at time t or t − 1. ηc,t is the country-year fixed effect that absorbs
time-varying country characteristics, such as the overall level of economic develop-
ment, government policies, and country-wide reforms. µi is the industry fixed effect
that absorbs the effects of industrial variation upon which our mechanism variables
are constructed. εc,i,t captures the omitted variables and is assumed to follow i.i.d.
Financial development could be endogenous due to omitted variables and the re-
verse causality between technological progress and financial services. Technology
changes relating to telecommunications and data processing have greatly spurred
financial innovations and services in commercial banking that have facilitated sec-
ondary markets for retail loans, such as credit card debt and mortgages. For example,
the introduction of Automated Teller Machines (ATMs), Debit Cards, Online Bank-
ing, and Prepaid Cards have significantly enhanced the banking account access and
amount of credits ([Frame et al., 2014]). It is hence necessary to take the endogeneity
issue of financial development into account. One way to account for it is to adopt
the [Rajan and Zingales, 1998] methodology by interacting with the financial devel-
opment of country c with the index of external financial dependence. The rationale
is that it is plausible to assume that the innovation changes of a specific industry
will not affect the financial depth in a country as a whole. We consider the following
15There are two major reasons why lagged financial development is included. A primary concern is that there exist
lags between financing a R&D project and output. The specific lags are uncertain and dependent upon the industries
and countries. Here we adopt the first order lagged value.
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specification
RQc,i,t = σ0 + αvalue addc,i,t−1 + EFDc,i ∗ (βFDc,t−1 + γFD2c,t−1) + δXc,i,t + ηc,t + µi + εc,i,t
(11)
where EFDc,i refers to the external financial dependence(EFD) for industry i in
country c. The EFD in our specification is different from that of being adopted in
[Rajan and Zingales, 1998] and many others in two respects. First, the definition
of EFD follows [Brown et al., 2013] and [Hsu et al., 2014] and is given in a broad
manner. Second, we construct the index for each country instead of using the EFD
from the Compustat’s North American and Global Annual Fundamentals. Again, the
details will be given below.
3.2. The Endogeneity of Financial Development
Although RZ specification is widely used in empirical studies, the major critique has
been the absence of valid instrumental variables for extracting the exogenous compo-
nent of financial development. [Levine, 1998] proposes to use the legal variables such
as creditor right, enforcement, and legal origin([La Porta et al., 1997]) to instrument
for the banking development. Similarly, [Brown et al., 2013] also use legal rules and
institutions as instruments for the country-level measures of stock market access. Fol-
low the previous literature, we use creditor right as instruments for the credit market,
while use Anti-self dealing index as instruments for the stock market development,
also we use legal origin and enforceability of contract as instruments for both eq-
uity and credit market. To conduct the IV regression, all industry-level variables are
averages over the full sample. We do this for two reasons. First, this allows us to
see the long-run effect of financial development on innovation while controlling for
the endogeneity issue of financial development. Second, Using the cross-section data
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allows us to reduce the influence of time-aggregation associated with the time-variant
IVs([Ahmed, 1998]). The basic specification will be
RQc,i = σ0 + αvalue addc,i + EFDc,i ∗ (βFDc + γFD2c ) + δXc,i + ηc + µi + εc,i
(12)
where EFDc,i ∗ FDc and EFDc,i ∗ FD2c will be the key endogenous variables.
4. Data, Measurement, and Sample Characteristics
4.1. The Construction of Research Quotient(RQ)
In this paper, We use a novel indicator of innovation, Research Quotient(RQ), as our
primary proxy for innovation, the RQ is defined as the firm-specific output elasticity of
R&D. The RQ has several advantages over the traditional innovation measures such
as patent counts, patent citation, R&D input, and TFP16. The currently available
version of RQ is constructed based on data from Compustat and the CRSP monthly
stock file. One limitation of this database is that it does not allow us to do the cross-
country analysis. To overcome this, we construct the RQ index for each firm from
different countries using data covering 1980-2018 retrieved from Worldscope Funda-
mentals Annual. The Worldscope database contains the annual financial report on
the world’s public and private companies. The total universe of companies contained
on the database, both extinct or inactive companies, is 101,400 scatter across 156
countries17. These companies represent approximately 95% of global market capital-
ization, thereby the revenue of firms on the database can well reflect the economic
development of the world as a whole. To capture the economic meaning of RQ, we
16see [Cooper et al., 2015] for more information on the comparison between RQ and other innovation indicators.
17Note that the count of firms is obtained by dropping the 314 firms without country identifier.
46












where Ycif,t is the output of firm f in industry i, country c at year t. Acif, is the firm
fixed effect, Kcif,t is the capital, Lcif,t is the total employees, Rcif,t−1 is the first-order
lagged R&D expenditure, Scif,t−1 is the first-order lagged spillover within the 4-digit
SIC industry in country c, ADcif,t is the selling and general administrative expense,
and εcif,t is the stochastic factors that affect firm production. γ can be interpreted as
the response of percent change in output to a one percent increase in R&D input, i.e.
the elasticity. There is no explicit assumption on the economy scale of production,
as firms are in different stages and scale, it could be either CRS, IRS, or DRS.
We derive RQ for each firm-year by estimating Equation (4) using a random coeffi-
cients model that allows for heterogeneity in the output elasticity for R&D as well as
all other inputs. The utilization of a random coefficient model follows from the need
to capture the firm-specific estimates of γ. The coefficient of the random coefficient
model consists of two components: the average effect of the full sample and the ran-
dom component that captures the individual specific effect. We adopt the following
three-level specification and the level-1 model for firm f , industry i, and country c is
lnYcif,t = aci0 + αci0lnRcif,t−1 + ∆ci0lnXcif,t + εcif,t (14)
to save the notation, we use Xcif,t to denote the control set and ∆ci0 representing the
corresponding coefficient. The intercept aci0 and slope αci0, ∆ci0 in the level-1 model
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vary between industries according to the following level-2 models:
aci0 = βc00 + βc10xci1,t + βc20xci2,t + rci0,t (15)
αci0 = βc10 + βc11xci1,t + βc21xci2,t + rci1,t (16)
∆ci0 = βc20 + βc12xci1,t + βc22xci2,t + rci2,t (17)
where xci1,t is a continuous predictor and grand-mean centered, and xci2,t is a dichoto-
mous predictor and uncentered. The intercepts and coefficients in the level-2 models
vary between countries according to the following level-3 models:
βmn,c = γmnl + γmnlw1c + γmnlw2c + umn,c m,n, l = 1, 2, 3 (18)
Substitute (6) through (9) into the (5) we can obtain the reduced form of specifica-
tion, for illustrative purpose, a parsimonious model for the relationships between firm
revenue and R&D lag and control set X can be obtained by specifying firm-specific
random slope ζci1, ζci2 and a firm-specific random intercept ζci3:
lnYcif,t = (a0 + ζci3) + (α0 + ζci1)lnRcif,t−1 + (∆0 + ζci2)lnXcif,t + εcif,t (19)
where the a0, α0and ∆0: represent the direct effect and ζcij, j = 1, 2, 3 represents the
firm-specific error,respectively.
Follow [Cooper et al., 2015], we conduct the estimation of RQ for each firm-year
by estimating regression (10) using rolling 10-years windows of the Worldscope Fun-
damental Annual from 1980 to 2018. The firm-level variable items include Rev-
enue(U.S.$) (Worldscope item 7240), Capital expenditure as a percent of total as-
sets(Worldscope item 8416), Total assets(U.S.$)(Worldscope item 2999), Employ-
ees(Worldscope item 8416), R&D expenditure(Worldscope item 1201), and Selling,
general and administrative expense(Worldscope item 1101). The capital expenditure
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is calculated as the product between item 8416 and item 2999. Notice that World-
scope provides some key items using the U.S. dollar, the Revenue(item 7240) is among
them. To manipulate the data under the same unit, we convert all the variables from
their national currency into the U.S. dollar using the current exchange rate. Also no-
tice that Worldscope provides two sets of exchange rates for use: the Exchange Rate
used in translating balance sheet and the Exchange Rate used in translating income
statement/cash flow. We do not use the exchange rate items provided in the database
since the series suffer from serious missing value, we obtain the exchange rate used in
translating balance sheet by dividing the Total assets(item 2999) by Total assets(item
7230). Similarly, the exchange rate used in translating income statement/cash flow
is calculated as the ratio of Revenues(item 1001) to Revenues(item 7240). Then we
convert R&D expenditure(item 1201), administrative expense(item 1101), and capi-
tal expenditure into the U.S. dollar using the income exchange rate.
A few words on the selling, general and administrative expense. Literatures typi-
cally use advertising as a control, the Worldscope database does not split the adver-
tising expense from the Administrative expense. However, it makes a lot of sense to
use the general administrative expense because it contains not only the advertising
expense but also includes other expenditures in operation provisions such as market-
ing, product promotion, delivery, etc. These activities cover the up- and down-stream
of the whole production, hence are critical to the firms’ revenues. In Worldscope, the
Selling, general and administrative expense also includes R&D expense(item 1201),
we subtract this item to avoid double counting.
4.2. The Construction of Firm-Specific Spillover
Next, we construct the firm-specific spillover as the sum of the differences in knowledge
between focal firm f and rival firm j for all firms in the 4-digit SIC industry18 with
18Worldscope provides eight SIC code, we select SIC code 1 because it assigns almost every firm a SIC code.
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Rcij,t −Rcif,t, ∀Rcij,t > Rcif,t (20)
We drop countries with less than 50 country-year observations, and only keep the
firms belong to manufacturing sectors(4-digit SIC code between 2000 and 3999). This
treatment is align with that of [Rajan and Zingales, 1998] and [Hsu et al., 2014]. In
line with the treatment in [Cooper et al., 2015], we require all firms to have a min-
imum of six years of non-missing R&D data within each ten-year window20. We
assign selling and administrative expense a zero if the firm-year observation for it is
missing. The random coefficient model gives the fixed effects that are invariant with
time, firms, and industries. To predict the firm-year specific effect, we first predict
the firm-specific random effects then define the RQ for each firm-year as the sum of
the fixed effect and firm-specific random effects in the last year of each window. As
a result, our RQ only covers the period between 1989 and 2018.
With the above preparations, we adopt the following procedures to obtain the
nation-industry-year data. First, we convert the 4-digit SIC code to the 2-digit SIC
code by grouping the 4-digit firms starting with the same first two digits into one
club. Second, we find the industry-year value of RQ using the median value of all
firms within a 2-digit industry at year t21 because the median value can exclude the
influence of outlier.
Table (2.1)-(2.3) report the statistics of RQ by country, industry, and country-
industry average. We also report the relative level of RQ to the U.S. level, denoted
19The spillover constructed above measures the technological spillover effect across industries within a national
geographic boundary, a broader measure of the spillover would be the spillover between industries by removing the
barriers of nations. However, consider that most of the firms do not involve international trade, this index could
suffice our purpose.
20There is no consensus about the optimal window length for rolling regression, the role of thumb is a 10-year long
window for a century data, as sensitivity analysis, we also experiment with 9-year, 8-year window. The results are
robust.
21We also use firm-size(market capitalization) based weighted average RQ as a measure of each 2-digit industry,
the correlation is 0.9870.
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as U.S. ref. We can see that in Table (2.1) RQ varies across countries. Although the
level of RQ is higher in developed economies than the emerging markets, there are
several exceptions, such as Brazil, Sri Lanka, and Egypt. The RQ of some emerg-
ing economies such as China and India is around 83% of the U.S. level. It means
that traditional measures of innovation may not capture the efficiency of intangible
capital(R&D input) utilization. Also, it may reflect the trend that emerging markets
are becoming more and more efficient and successful in using the capital and taking
market share. Some developed countries may have a larger amount of patent filing,
but the RQ is smaller, for example, Australia, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Poland, and
Isreal. This is also consistent with the macroeconomic fact that these countries are
going through declining in productivity growth. In the industry level, Tobacco Prod-
ucts(SIC 21) and Petroleum & Coal Products(SIC 29) sector has the highest RQ,
Electronic(SIC 36) and Instruments(38) are among the high RQ group.
Figure (1.1) shows the time series trend of RQ by SIC 20-39. The value of each
industry-year pair is calculated as the country average by industry-year. An inter-
esting pattern emerges. For each sector, the RQ has declined since the starting date
of our sample and arrived at the trough level of nearly 0.1 around 2000, by around
2009, it bounced back to a level lower than the initial level in 1989, and then slowed
down again. Despite the cyclical trend, the RQ has dropped on average by 66.87%
in the long run.
4.3. The Construction of External Financial Dependence Index
Existing literature typically follow the [Rajan and Zingales, 1998]’s way of construct-
ing the external financial dependence index, that is, using the public firms listed in
major US stock market from the Compustat North America database to calculate the
value for each industry in the manufacturing sector. An important assumption is that
the dependence of U.S. firms on external finance serves as a good proxy for the de-
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mand for external funds in other countries. According to [Rajan and Zingales, 1998],
there are two important reasons for this. First, industries’ demand for external
funds across countries is assumed to be homogenous when responding to techno-
logical shocks. Second, the authors cannot access to flow of funds data for other
countries due to data limitation. Several important works have shown that the
technological gap between poor and rich countries has been widening and this is
mainly due to the difference in the development of the financial market in the local
country([Aghion et al., 2005b] and [Comin and Nanda, 2019]). Regarding the second
concern, the Worldscope database provides variable Funds from operations(Worldscope
item 4201), which helps remove the barries for building the external financial depen-
dence for each country alone. The purpose of establishing the EFD is to account
for the heterogeneity of the financial dependence among different countries. Follow
[Rajan and Zingales, 1998] and [Hsu et al., 2014], we define cash flow from opera-
tions as funds from operations(item 4201) plus decreases in inventories(item 4826),
decreases in receivables(item 4825), and increases in account payable(item 4827).
Capital expenditure and R&D expense are item 4601 and item 1201, respectively.
Each firm’s dependence on external finance is calculated as capital expenditures plus
R&D expenditures minus cash flows from operations, all divided by the sum of capital
expenditures and R&D expense. Within a country, the time series of each industry’s
dependence on external finance is then calculated as the median of all firms’ de-
pendence on external finance in a year22. We then compute the invariant external
dependence of each industry in a country as the time series median of the indus-
try’s dependence on external finance during the period 1989-2018. An industry with
higher external finance dependence uses more external financing to fund its tangible
and intangible investment.
Table (2.19) shows the correlation matrix between the US and other countries
22All the values are converted to U.S. dollar.
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in terms of the External Finance Dependence. We can see that several developed
economies such as Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, South Korea, Netherland, Poland, Sweden, and the UK show a significant
correlation with U.S.A in terms of the External Financing Dependence. So it is
reasonable to use the U.S. index to proxy for the external financing demand of indus-
tries in these countries, but still, we can observe that some developed economies such
as Austria, Canada, Isreal, and Singapore show no significant correlation with the
U.S.A. Regarding the emerging markets, only Brazil shows a very weak correlation
with the U.S.A, all else has no significant relation with the U.S.A. In particular, the
Philippines even negatively associate with the EFD of the U.S.A. This fact is critical
since it shows that industries’ dependence on external financing differ across countries,
therefore, simply using the U.S. index may work if the study is limited to the industri-
alized economies, however, it may generate bias estimates if more emerging markets
are included. This justifies our construction of cross-country EFD database23.
4.4. The Construction of Index of Competition
An important control in our specification is the competition among firms within
the same industry. The relationship between competition and innovation has been
discussed extensively. Competition could be good for innovation but only to a certain
extent as indicated by [Aghion et al., 2005a]. Either monopoly or perfect competition
tends to dampen innovation. Follow [Nickell, 1996] and [Aghion et al., 2005a], we
use the Lerner Index as the measure of product market competition as it has several
advantages over indicators such as market share or the Herfindahl concentration index.
To measure it, we first calculate the price-cost margin by dividing the net operating
23In unreported results, using Compustat North America and Global database, we find a similar pattern in the
Worldscope database. The results are available upon request.
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Notice that, the above formula is the definition of operating profit margin(Worldscope
item 8316). With this, the competition measure is defined as 100 minus the median
value of licif,t across firms within the industry at year t in a country. A value of 100
indicates perfect competition while values below 100 indicate some degree of market
concentration.
Column (3) of Table (2.1) shows the country average index of competition. Most
of the level of competition is above 0.9, which means a country’s market is relatively
competitive. Some countries such as Brazil, China, and Egypt have a level below 0.9,
this is an indication of the relatively concentrated market.
4.5. Measurements of Financial Development
In this paper, we investigate how financial development affects innovation. A com-
plete picture of financial development includes the development in both credit and
equity markets. For the equity market, we use stock market capitalization to GDP
(%) and stock market total value traded to GDP (%) to measure the depth of equity
market of country i at yeat t. The stock market turnover ratio (%) is used to measure
the efficiency of the equity market. For the credit market, we use private credit by
deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP (%), private credit by
deposit money banks to GDP (%), and liquid liabilities to GDP (%) as measures
for credit market depth. These country-level series are available at the World Bank
Global Financial Development Database.
Due to data limitation in accessibility and efficiency of the credit market and eq-
uity market in some countries, as a robustness check, we complement this by using
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a comprehensive financial development index from the IMF Financial Development
Index database. The index takes into account the complex multidimensional nature
of financial development, it summarizes how developed financial institutions and fi-
nancial markets are in terms of their depth, access, and efficiency using nine indices
for over 180 countries with annual frequency from 1980 onwards. Each index is a
weighted linear average of the underlying series, where the weights are obtained from
principal component analysis, reflecting the contribution of each underlying series
to the variation in the specific index. For more information on how the indices are
defined and constructed, see [Svirydzenka, 2016]. Table (2.3) gives the descriptive
statistics for each indicator used.
5. The results
5.1. The Differential Behavior Between Equity and Credit Market
Notice that the results may be biased and mixed when estimating the effect of the
equity market on innovation without isolating the contribution of the credit market,
and vice versa. Given this consideration, we present the results in Table (2.4) and
(2.5) by controlling for the credit market when estimating the effect of the equity
market. The indicator of credit market employed is private credit(% GDP), we also
use the other two indicators of the credit market as a robustness check and find the
results are consistent24.
In Table (2.4), we capture the intuition by looking at whether financial develop-
ment(thereafter, FD) has a nonlinear effect on innovation. The results show that
equity and credit market exhibits differential effects. Specifically, the stock value
traded and turnover ratio indicate a kick-in effect on innovation. That is, the equity
market will not effectively promote innovation until it reaches a certain level, a larger
24A similar treatment holds when examining the effect of credit market by controlling for the equity market, we
employ stock capitalization as control variable
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and more efficient equity market means more opportunities for innovative activities
because it makes it easier for firms to raise funds and use it for their risky and long-
cycle projects. Since we have not considered the overall effect of the equity market on
innovation, this result is partially consistent with the prediction of hypothesis 2 is the
part that the effect depends upon the characteristics of the equity market. On the
contrary, the development of the credit market has a diminishing effect on innovation.
That is, the expansion of credit market depth may impede the innovative activities.
This preliminary result on credit market is consistent with hypothesis 1.
Notice that these results do not distinguish the potential heterogeneous effect of
financial development on innovation across sectors, so it is necessary to re-examine
the results considering how the effects vary within sectors that have similar external
financing demands. Empirically, we make the interaction between FD and EFD, and
the square of FD and EFD. The results in column (1)-(3) of Table (2.5) show that
both stock market depth, as measured by capitalization, and turnover ratio imposes
a kick-in effect on innovation, despite the fact that the coefficient on value traded is
not significant. The estimated threshold value is 95.8% and 130% of GDP, respec-
tively. For the credit market, the inverted-U shape retains for all three indicators of
credit market development, and the estimated threshold value of the credit market
is between 66.7% and 90.6% of GDP. The estimated threshold values are not very
large compared to most of the value documented in FD-Growth literatures, which are
above 90%. In sum, Table (2.4) and (2.5) present evidence that is consistent with
hypothesis 1, but partially inconsistent with hypothesis 2.
5.2. The Overall Effect of FD on Innovation
Above we distinguish the effect of credit from the equity market on innovation, but
what would be the overall effect of financial development on innovation? To do this,
we use the index of financial development developed by [Svirydzenka, 2016]. The
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broad index of financial development is constructed by synthesizing the development
of the financial market and financial institutions. As shown in Table (2.6), the over-
all effect of FD on innovation follows an inverted-U shape. Notice that the optimal
threshold value of FD bears no economic or policy implication as it is an index value
rather raw number. Moving to the index of financial markets(FM), which is a weighted
linear combination of equity market depth, access, and efficiency, we also find a sig-
nificant diminishing effect of equity market development on innovation. This result
is consistent with the prediction of hypothesis 2. We also consider three different
sub-index of financial markets, i.e. depth, accessibility, and efficiency. The financial
market depth synthesizes stock market capitalization to GDP, the stock traded to
GDP, total debt securities of financial corporation to GDP, etc. we find significant
inverted-U shape. A similar pattern is detected in the financial market access, which
measures the percent of market capitalization outside of the top 10 largest compa-
nies and the total number of issuers of debt (domestic and external, fin. and nonfat.
corporations) per 100,000 adults. A higher access index indicates that more firms
can raise funds through the stock market. This makes it easier for firms to increases
the R&D investment, on the other hand, however, firms are more inclined to allocate
their R&D toward more conventional and mediocre projects, thus may reduce the
quantity and quality of innovation.
Moving to the index of Financial Institution(FI), which is a weighted index of fi-
nancial institution depth, access, and efficiency. We find significant inverted-U shape
between the credit market and innovation. Financial institution depth is measured
as the synthesis of private-sector credit to GDP, pension fund assets to GDP, Mutual
fund assets to GDP, and insurance premiums to GDP. We find a significant dimin-
ishing effect on innovation. The financial institution access is defined as bank and
ATM branches per 100,000 adults. This index is an indication of the scale of banking
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credit. We also find a clear inverted-U shape. There is no clear nonlinear effect in
FI efficiency, which comprises the net interest margin, lending-deposits spread, etc.
While the threshold value of these index means no clear policy implication, the turn-
ing points center around 0.5. In sum, we find results consistent with the hypotheses
that financial development imposes an inverted-U effect on innovation.
6. The Robustness Checks
In this section, we design three methods to check the robustness of the results. First,
we adopt the convention measures of innovation such as industry level patent counts
and forward citation weighted patents by merging database Compustat North Amer-
ica Annual, Compustat Global Annual, and USPTO. Second, We consider how fi-
nancial development affects the technology-intensive manufacturing industries. We
conduct This examination for two major reasons. 1) If financial development affects
innovation nonlinearly, then this effect should be more evident in the technology-
intensive sector. 2) This step also serves as a way to explore the potential channel
through which financial development affects innovation nonlinearly, although this is
likely not a deep-rooted channel. Third, We account for the endogeneity of finan-
cial development, using legal origin, the enforceability of the contract, creditor right,
anti-self dealing as instrumental variables.
6.1. Using Patent Counts and Citation weighted Patents as Measures of
Innovation
Even though Research Quotient could overcome several limitations in conventional
innovation measures, there are shortcomings in itself. For example, it is a market-
oriented measure, which may ignore the influence of law on innovation such as in-
tellectual property rights protection. So it is necessary to employ the conventional
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indicators of innovation to examine the robustness of the above results. An ideal
way of doing this is to provide the Worldscope-USPTO matched patent data for each
firm-year pair. However, USPTO provides GVKEY code for each firm, while World-
scope provides non-GVKEY code. A potential approach would be Fuzzy Matching
by the name of assignees, but this may generate significant bias and measurement
error. An alternative solution is to use data from Compustat Global Fundamentals
Annual, which matches with USPTO patent database.
Notice that Compustat Global Fundamentals Annuals database does not include
the Compustat North America, so we first merge the two separate databases into one.
Since we focus on the innovations in the manufacturing sector, we drop the 4-digit SIC
code beyond 2000 and 3999. We also drop firms with missing GVKEY because we are
unable to assign the patent to these anonymous firms. In the next step, we match the
USPTO patent with the firms in the merged Compustat database. USPTO provide
the filing date of each patent in a D/M/Y format, we first convert this date format
into the year format only. Then, we calculate the total patent application of a firm
for a given year and aggregate them into the 2-digit SIC industrial level according to
the concordance table between SIC 2-digit and 4-digit code. Pure patent counts do
not measure the quality or importance of innovation, a better measure is to use the
citation weighted patent. Similar procedures can be applied to generate the forward
citation weighted patent25. To account for the truncation issue, we adopt a method
different from Hall(2005)’s citation lag weight matrix.
1. we first generate the maximum value of patent citation within the same technol-
ogy class at a given application year.
2. then generate the portion of each patents citation to the maximum citation. This
step gives the relative forward citations each patent receives.
25We do not use pure citation data to avoid the citation lag issue
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3. Find the total citation of patent that each firm has issued given an application
year.
4. Aggregate the industry citation-weighted patent by summing up the value of
each firm within the same 2 digit SIC industry.
The Compustat Global Fundamentals Annual database starts from the year 198726,
so our final data comprise of 98 countries from 1987-201727.
Table (2.7) reports the nonlinear effect of financial development on innovation as
measured by the log value of industrial-level patent counts. In this table, we remove
data from the US to control for the home-bias effect because we are using the patent
and citation data from USPTO. We also control for the credit market when esti-
mating the effect of equity market development on innovation, and vice verse. The
results show that there exists a significant kick-in effect in the equity market, while
in the credit market, we find a diminishing effect. Specifically, the coefficient on the
square term of capitalization is negative, while it is positive on the value traded and
turnover ratio. Regarding the credit market, the coefficient on the square term of
total private and liquidity are negative, but no significant effect on deposit credit.
In particular, the threshold value of value traded and turn over ratio is 44.4% and
63.3% of GDP, respectively. In the credit market, the threshold value of liquidity is
around 31% of GDP. The small threshold value of financial development using patent
as an innovation measure may be attributed to the zero industrial patents in many
countries. The agglomeration of zero samples may compress the threshold.
Notice that the coefficient on the square term of competition is negative while the
coefficient is positive on the competition. It means both lower and higher degrees
of competition may not be good for innovative activities. The optimal level of the
26The starting date is another important consideration why we do not use Compustat data to construct the Research
Quotient database because using a 10-year rolling window significantly reduces our data coverage
27The third reason why use the Compustat database is that it contains more countries spanning across high income,
middle income, and lower-income countries.
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degree of competition is between 0.59 and 0.70.
In Table (2.8), we use the forward citation weighted patent count and the results
reconfirm the patterns in previous tables. Specifically, in the equity market, value
traded and turnover ratio show a kick-in effect on innovation, the coefficient on cap-
italization*EFD is negative, which indicates excessive stock expansion may not be
good to innovation. In the credit market, however, we find a diminishing effect on
innovation for total private and liquidity, but not in the deposit.
To examine the overall effect of financial development on innovation, we again use
the index of FD. The indicator of innovation employed is forward citation weighted
patent counts. The results in Table (2.9) show that financial development imposes a
diminishing effect on innovation and is consistent with the pattern documented using
RQ. In particular, the threshold value of the index is relatively smaller compared
to using RQ as the independent variable, as this may due to the many zero patent
samples. In unreported results, we use the patent counts as a measure of innovation
and find similar results.
Combining Table (2.7), (2.8), and (2.9) we can show that credit market expan-
sion not only hurts the quantity but also the quality of innovation. This pattern
has important implications for economic growth. In recent years, several empiri-
cal studies have documented that too much finance may harm economic growth(e.g.
[Arcand et al., 2015]). These studies do not explicitly explore the channels through
which too much finance(or more specifically, the credit market expansion) harms
the growth. Since innovation is the driving factor of growth, it is thus possible
that too much finance harm growth through its diminishing effect on innovation.
In [Zhu et al., 2020], we show that this diminishing effect of credit market expan-
sion on innovation serves as a channel for too much finance phenomenon, one ques-
tion remains unsettled in that paper is that we also find that the contribution of
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innovation on growth decreases with the level of financial development. We ex-
plain that an innovation will not be effective in promoting productivity and ag-
gregate growth until necessary complementary inventions and follow-up investment
in productive capital occurs. As the credit market develops, banks and firms de-
velop close ties. This close firm-bank ties may facilitate firms to access credit,
but it may also prevent firms from involving risky projects such as R&D activities
([Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998]), causing less productive but more pledgeable projects
to be easily financed ([Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015]). The relatively less invest-
ment of productive capital may prolong the implementation and restructuring lags
and reduce the contribution of innovation on growth. The basic idea is that credit
market expansion reduces the quality of innovation and thus the growth. Our results
in Table (2.8) and (2.9) confirm this hypothesis. Another note is about the equity
market, we find that different dimensions of equity market may have differentiated
effects, but the overall effect of equity market development has a diminishing effect
on innovation, as in the credit market. Overall, this aligns with the arguments in
hypothesis 2.
6.2. High Technology VS. Non-high Technology Manufacturing Sectors
In this section, we examine the differential effect of financial development on sectors
with different technology intensity. [Kile and Phillips, 2009] classify 3-digit SIC code
industry 283, 357, 366, 382, 384, 481, 482, 489, 737, and 873 as the high technol-
ogy industries28. Mapping to the 2-digit SIC code, it roughly classifies 2-digit code
35(Industrial Machinery & Equipment), 36(Electronic & Other Electric Equipment),
38(Instruments & Related Products), and 48(Communications) as high technology
industries. Since these studies consider the innovation in the manufacturing sector,
28The distribution of these codes are: Computer Hardware Manufacturing(357,367), Software Development(737),
Medical Technology(283, 873), Communications(366, 481, 482, 489), Electronic Manufacturing(367), and Internet&
IT Service(737). More classification details can be found at [Kile and Phillips, 2009]
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we exclude SIC code 48, which belongs to the Transportation & Public Utilities sec-
tor.
To give an idea about the importance and evolution of innovation in high technol-
ogy industries, we generate the share of total patents listed above to the total industry
patents as a measure of the relative importance of high technology industries in terms
of innovation from the merged Compustat Database. Figure (1.2) depicts the time
series trends of innovation share in high technology-intensive manufacturing indus-
tries for several selected countries such as China, Japan, Canada, and France. We
can see that the contribution of the high tech sector to innovation in China amount
to nearly 100%, meaning that most of the innovations in China come from these two
sectors, and the share tends to slow down in China since 2010. In Japan, this share
increases stably but with a small speed since the late 1980s. The naked eye metric
shows that the share of high technology innovation is not significantly affected by
the financial crisis between 2007 and 2008. The picture is different for Canada and
France. It clearly shows that, in Canada, the share of high technology industry in-
novation keeps climbing up and it reaches a peak by the year 2007, then suddenly
fell to a level equivalent to the year 2001. The share recovered to the pre-crisis level
by the year 2016. The story in France is a little bit different from that of Canada.
The share of high technology industry innovation in France arrives at its peak level
around mid-1990, then it began to decline since around the year 2000, the financial
crisis may give a punch on this declining trend, bringing the share to its lowest level
in the period examined. The share then recovers back to a level equivalent to the
year 2007 by the year 2015.
The above evidences show that the financial crisis may have a mixed effect on high
technology sector innovation. But do we need to worry about that? We construct
the global average share of high technology industry innovation and it is presented in
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Figure (1.3). We can see that the world-wide share began to increase since the late
1980s, this is largely driven by the internet boom. The share has increased exponen-
tially from less than 20% to more than 45% by the year 2000. The process stagnated
even before the financial crisis. We can detect a mild drop in the share during the
crisis, but the magnitude of this fall can hardly earn its credit to be a primary concern
when comparing to other drops in the entire cycle. In [Zhu et al., 2020], we also con-
sider how the banking crisis, post-financial crisis, and the European Sovereign Debt
Crisis has affected the innovation, the results show no significant impact. Another
signal is that the share increases since the year 2012, which indicates that the impact
of the post-financial crisis on high technology industry innovation comes to an end.
Given the above considerations, we think that the impact of the financial crisis is not
a major concern.
We use different indicators of financial development testing on how financial de-
velopment affects high technology manufacturing industries and Non-high technology
industries. The results in Table (2.10) shows that financial development has differ-
ential effects on innovation in high and non-high technology industries. Panel A of
Table (2.10) shows the results for high technology manufacturing industries. We find
inverted-U shape between capitalization-innovation nexus, and stock value traded-
innovation nexus, the effect for turn over ratio is not significant. Meanwhile, we find
that credit markets do not impose any significant effect on innovation for high tech
industries. The effect flips when turning to the non-high tech industries. Specifically,
we find no significant effect for the equity market, while finding a diminishing effect
for the credit market, as shown in column (5) and (6) of Panel B. These indicate
that equity market matters more to high technology industries, while credit market
means more to non-high technology industries. A possible reason could be that high
technology is more likely to access the equity market rather than the credit market
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due to its high risky nature of its projects. Banks are less likely to make loans to
these companies and thus credit market may play a less significant role in affecting
its innovative activities. In non-high technology industries, firms are more easier to
access the credit market, making credit play a primary role in shaping its innovation.
Despite the differential effects detected, we find that both equity and credit mar-
kets impose a diminishing effect on innovation in its domain.
6.3. The Legal Rules as Instruments
The major obstacle to empirical research in this area is that financial development and
innovation could be mutually endogenous due to the reverse causality between techno-
logical progress and financial services. Technology changes relevant for telecommuni-
cations and data processing have greatly spurred financial innovations and services in
commercial banking that have facilitated secondary markets for retail loans, such as
credit card debt and mortgages. For example, the introduction of Automated Teller
Machines (ATMs), Debit Cards, Online Banking, and Prepaid Cards have signifi-
cantly enhanced the banking account access and amount of credits ([Frame et al., 2014]).
Although industry-level data can well account for the endogeneity of financial devel-
opment, the technological shocks in the specific sector have a significant impact on
the entire financial markets. Without addressing this, any results we find are likely
to be biased.
In Table (2.12), we follow an extensive literature and rely on predetermined legal
variables as instruments for both equity market and credit market development mea-
sures. The legal system is considered to be an important determinant of cross-country
variations in access to external finance. Different market regulations and laws that
protect investors or creditors’ rights matter for their access to external finance. In
particular, we use creditor right, enforcement, legal origin, and their combinations to
instrument for the credit market development. While use anti-self dealing, enforce-
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ment, legal origin, and their combinations as IVs for equity market development. In
column (1), (5), and (9), we report two-stage least square estimates of equation (3)
using an index called Anti-self dealing(ASD, thereafter), which measures the legal
protection of minority shareholders. This index is scaled between zero and one with
a higher value indicating stronger shareholder protection. The IV estimate on the
two interaction terms is not statistically significant at 10% for all three measures of
stock market development. We then replace the ASD with a dummy variable equal
to one if a country is of common law legal origin to instrument for the stock market.
Legal origin is widely used to instrument for financial development because it is ar-
guably exogenous to contemporary economic and financial development. The results
are shown in column (2), (6), and (10). Again, we find no significant nonlinear effect
of the stock market on innovation in the long run. Next, in column (3), (7), and (11)
we consider another index named enforcement, which measures the relative degree to
which contractual agreements are honored. This index is scaled from 0 to 10 with
higher scores indicating higher enforceability. We find the significant inverted-U ef-
fect on innovation for all three indicators of stock market development. Finally, using
ASD and legal origin as instruments returns insignificantly effect, as shown in column
(4), (8), and (12). Following similar procedures, column (13)-(24) estimates the IV
regressions for the credit market. Column (13), (17), and (21) uses creditor right pro-
tection as an instrument for credit market development, and show clearly that credit
market development has a diminishing effect on innovation. Using legal origin as an
instrument for the credit market, we find no significant effect, as indicated in columns
(14), (18), and (22). Next, we replace the legal origin with the enforcement index
and find a significant inverted-U relationship for all three indicators. Finally, using
legal origin and creditor right protection as instruments, we find a similar inverted-U
pattern.
66
As a comparison, we also present the baseline results for the long-run effect of
financial development on innovation in Table (2.11). We find that in both the credit
and equity markets, there exists a significant inverted-U shape between finance and
innovation. Despite the fact that some of the IV estimates for the stock market
in Table (2.12) shows no significant nonlinear effect, the overall IV results in Table
(2.12) support the baseline results in Table (2.11), indicating that excessive access to
the stock market and credit market financing has an important nonlinear effect on
innovative activities. 29
7. Financial Development and Market Structure
In this section, we propose an explanation as to why the overall financial develop-
ment imposes a diminishing effect on innovation. An important channel through
which financial development affects the innovation is altering the market structure,
particularly, the market competition within the industry. The basic idea is illus-
trated in Figure (1.4). The blue line indicates the potential causal relationship be-
tween the three variables, while the red line refers to the reserve causal relationships.
We want to show that 1) financial development affects the market structure nonlin-
early, 2)then it transmits to the industrial level innovation, and 3) this process is
not distorted by the potential reserve causality. Our argument consists of two major
lines. In the first line, financial development eases the cost of borrowing, facilitating
firms’ access to credits and funds. There may exist two competing effects in this
process([Aghion et al., 2019]). On one hand, it makes it easier for both large incum-
29In this note, we consider an alternative way to account for the endogeneity of financial development. Notice
that the technologies that promote financial market mainly relate to telecommunications and data processing, which
may involve technology in Telecommunications Wiring & Cabling (4-digit SIC code 1623 and 1731), Sound Systems &
Equipment(SIC 3651), Security Control Equipment & Systems (SIC 3669-02), Communications Equipment NEC (SIC
3669-98), Audio and Video Equipment (SIC 3679), Wireless Communications Equipment (SIC 3679-01), Cellular and
other wireless telecommunications (SIC 4812), Telecommunications except radio (SIC 4813 ), and Data Processing
Supplies (SIC 5112). Since we focus on the manufacturing sector, therefore, the sector that causes reverse causality
between financial development and innovation mainly comes from the innovation in Electronic, Electronical Equipment
& Components, Except Computer Equipment (SIC 36). One way of controlling for the endogeneity issue is to remove
the innovation in industry SIC 36. In unreported results, we find similar patterns.
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bents and new innovative entrants to access to the credits and funds and financing
the R&D projects. On the other hand, however, it also makes them less productive
incumbents easier to stay on the market and depress the new entrants from entering
the market using price strategy. The overall effect could be that too many finan-
cial activities promote the R&D and innovation up to a certain level, but the effects
tend to diminish as the level of FD continues to expand. The key implication here is
that financial development may affect the structure of the market, mainly the market
competition. Therefore, to account for the nonlinear effect of financial development
on innovation, it is interesting to see whether market competition affects innovation
nonlinearly. The second line is about the link between market competition and inno-
vation. Conventional thoughts on the effect of competition on innovation is a mono-
tonic one. However, the effect could be nonlinear, as shown in [Aghion et al., 2005a].
Perfect competition and monopoly are both bad for innovation, there exists an opti-
mal degree of market competition. A work by [Liu et al., 2019] documented similar
results that market structure becomes more monopolistic as the interest rate declines.
Connecting these two lines, it is natural to reason that financial development im-
poses a diminishing effect on innovation via its effect on market competition. From
[Aghion et al., 2005a] we know that there exists an inverted-U shape between com-
petition and innovation, if the inverted-U between finance and innovation holds, then
there may exist an inverted-U shape between finance and competition. A higher
level of financial development causes an intensive market concentration, therefore re-
duces the innovation. The rest part of this section is to test the hypothesis that
there exists an inverted-U shape between financial development and market compe-
tition. But before proceeding to the empirical part, a few words of caution about
the endogeneity. First, market competition and innovation are mutually affected. In
[Aghion et al., 2005a], the authors use a set of industrial policy shocks that affect
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the industry competition as instrumental variables, showing that the causality from
competition to innovation holds robustly. Second, financial development and innova-
tion could also be mutually endogenous. We have shown that financial development
causally affects innovation. Therefore, if the nonlinear finance-competition nexus is
successfully documented, then we will be able to close the transmission chain.
To test the hypothesis, we employ a simple quadratic form and regress competition
on financial development and test if there exists a significant inverted-U shape be-
tween finance and competition. Notice that the measure of the competition uses the
Lerner Index, which accounts for the factors that affect competition such as product
differentiation and market share of large firms. In our regression, we include the initial
share of value-added for the top 10 largest firms within each industry, the purpose is
to control for the strucutre inertia. Besides, we include the industry-year fixed effects
that account for the time-varying industry characteristics, such as the introduction
of policy changes across industries. We also include the country fixed effects.
Table (2.13) shows that both databases give similar results that there exists a sig-
nificant inverted-U shape between financial development and competition. Using the
Worldscope database, we can see that more finance promotes competition in the first
stage and then reduces it in industries that are more dependent upon external financ-
ing. The turning point is between 96.6%-150% of GDP. Using the merged Compustat
Global database, stock value traded and liquidity give a significant diminishing effect
on innovation. The threshold is 55% and 50% of GDP, respectively. Collectively, the
threshold range is similar to that of in Table (2.5) and (2.7). This indicates that
the effect of financial development on competition could serve as a channel for the
nonlinear effect of financial development on innovation.
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To further test this statement, consider the following specification
innocit = σ0 + αvalueaddci,1989 + EFDcit ∗ (βcompcit + γcompct ∗ FDct) + δXcit + ηc,t + µi + εcit
(21)
where innocit is the innovation and compcit indicates the degree of competition. The
interpretation of this specification is that if competition serves as a channel, then the
effect of competition on innovation is dependent upon the level of financial develop-
ment. In industries that rely more on external financing, more finance causes less
competition and thus reduce innovation. We expect the coefficient γon the interac-
tion term compct ∗ FDct to be negative.
Table (2.14) summarizes the results using different measures of innovation from
two databases. Panel A uses RQ as an indicator of innovation, we can see that
the coefficient on the interaction term between competition and financial develop-
ment is negative, with stock capitalization as an exception. Meanwhile, the coeffi-
cient of competition is positive for most indicators. Combining these two pieces of
evidence, it can be induced that the marginal effect of competition on innovation,
EFDcit ∗ (β + γ ∗ FDct), decreases with the level of financial in industries that rely
more on external financing. Take total private as a percentage of GDP as an example,
the marginal effect of competition on innovation is EFD ∗ (0.007 − 0.007 ∗ FD), if
EFD is positive, then the marginal effect turns to negative as the level of private
credits exceeds 100% of GDP. The decreasing marginal effects hold as we switch to
the Compustat database. Panel B uses patent counts as a measure of innovation, we
find a negative coefficient of the interaction term on stock capitalization, total pri-
vate, liquidity, and deposit credit. Panel C uses the citation weighted patent counts
and find that the coefficients on the interaction term for indicators in both equity and
credit markets are negative, in particular, the coefficient on competition is positive
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as well.
8. The Heterogeneous Effects by Stages of Development
To examine whether this effect varies for countries with different development stages,
we split the sample into two groups based on the income level by twisting a little bit
the World Bank Country Classification System. The upper and lower-middle-income
countries are categorized into a middle-income country, the rest countries are high-
income country. Grouping the country based on the level of financial development
generates similar results since high-income countries overlap with the high level of
FD countries. In Table (2.15), we control the effect of the credit market when ex-
amining the effect of equity market on innovation, and vice versa. The results in
Table (2.15) indicates two patterns. regarding the high-income group, we find that
there exists a significant diminishing effect of financial development on innovation in
both equity and credit market. While another picture emerges in the middle-income
group, for both the credit and equity market, financial development exhibits a clear
U-shape effect on innovation. For each indicator of financial development, the esti-
mated threshold values in the high and middle groups are close. For example, the
estimated threshold value of stock capitalization is 155.5% of GDP for high-income
countries, it is 114.2% of GDP in middle-income countries. For the turnover ratio, it
is 100% in the high-income group, and it is 91.6% in the middle-income group. We
also examine this using Compustat database and the index of financial development,
we find a robust result for this pattern, as shown in Table (2.16) and (2.17). Combine
these two patterns we find that in a similar threshold range, the effect of financial de-
velopment on innovation behaves differently between the high and the middle-income
countries. As illustrated in Figure (1.5), after exceeding the threshold range, financial
development begins to impede innovation in the high-income group, while it begins
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to foster innovation in middle-income countries. This evidence contradicts the argu-
ments in the hypothesis, in which it may apply to the developed countries but not
the middle-income countries. Why?
We think this relates to the financial development, types of innovation, and market
competition. Most firms in emerging markets(or developing countries) are engaged
in activities far from the technological frontier, the innovation in these economies is
mainly about adopting new ideas and technologies already in use in more developed
countries ([Zanello et al., 2016]). This matters for market power because different
types of innovation means different impacts on market competition. In emerging
markets, using external finance has a significant positive effect on the extent of firm
innovation, such as introducing a new product line, upgrading existing product lines,
and opening a new plant([Ayyagari et al., 2011])30. Most of these innovative activi-
ties is not about introducing new products or new inventions, therefore, it has less
power to reshape the market structure. While in most developed countries, the firm
innovation is about bringing in new products, which may lead to market concentra-
tion and the creation of monopolistic power. The intensity of competition relates to
innovation is an Inverted-U shape, as shown in [Aghion et al., 2005a], it spurs inno-
vation among the more technologically advanced incumbents and discourages laggard
firms from innovating, causing the distance between leaders and followers to increase.
Combining these three elements we can depict the timeline of the story. Financial de-
velopment promotes innovation in both developing countries and developed countries,
however, more finance may impede innovation in developed economies because the
easier availability of external finance makes it easier to generate new technology fron-
tier, which may lead to further market concentration due to the monopolistic power
of new products. While the market structure in an emerging market is less likely to
30Notice that in [Ayyagari et al., 2011], the author adopts a more broadly defined measure of innovation based on
the World Bank Enterprise Survey
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be affected because most of the innovation is by adopting technology in developed
countries, this follower-strategy gives less superiority to firms in developing countries.
9. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we conduct a thorough study on the nonlinear effect of financial de-
velopment on innovation as well as the potential channels. We construct a unique
cross country Research Quotient database from the Worldscope Fundamentals An-
nual for 48 countries from 1980 to 2017. We also use another database by merging
the Compustat North America, Global Annual, and USPTO to check the robustness,
this database consists of 98 countries from 1987-2017. We find a significant overall
nonlinear effect of financial development on innovation. When examining different
characteristics of the credit market and equity market, we find the effect differs. In
particular, there exists weak evidence of the kick-in effect in the equity market, but
the diminishing effect of the credit market is solid and robust. We also find that
equity markets impose an inverted-U effect on innovation in high technology sectors,
while credit markets have an inverted-U effect on innovation in non-high technology
industries. We then explain the overall diminishing effect. We find that the nonlinear
effect of financial development on market competition serves as a potential channel
through which finance affects innovation nonlinearly. In the final section, we show
that the effect of financial development on innovation may be country-specific. It is
heterogeneous across different stages of development. In emerging markets, despite
the types of financial markets, there exists a kick-in effect on innovation, however, it
is a diminishing effect on innovation for developed countries.
This research calls for a comprehensive measurement of financial development. As
mentioned above, the widely adopted indicators of financial development developed
by the World Bank provide a single-dimension measure of financial system, reflecting
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characteristics such as depth, accessibility, and efficiency. One merit of these indi-
cators is that they convey real economic meanings and it enables the researchers to
provide specific instructions for policymakers, however, it limits the scholars to view
the financial system as a whole. What could be a better way to synthesize different
indicators to provide a systematic indicator while preserving economic meaning is a
question that remains to be explored.
A possible extension to this current work is to give a thorough study on the pos-
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Innovation regression
Patent 5.351 5.353 1.726 1.075 9.169 300
Utility models 3.808 3.747 2.273 -1.531 7.985 294
R&D 1.266 0.892 1.054 0.05 4.26 276
FDI 0.048 0.021 0.169 -0.04 2.691 300
GDP/capita 9.773 9.946 0.851 7.502 11.311 300
Population 17.003 17.096 1.651 12.471 21.039 300
Schooling 8.906 9.06 2.654 2.42 13.4 300
IP 3.435 3.68 1.051 0.2 4.875 300
Growth regression
Growth rate 0.023 0.019 0.025 -0.045 0.244 300
Govt 0.163 0.164 0.05 0.055 0.3 300
Trade 0.754 0.601 0.587 0.156 4.109 300
Investment 0.237 0.228 0.058 0.098 0.474 300
Inflation 0.195 0.032 1.365 -0.017 16.672 300
Initial GDP/capita 9.496 9.509 0.877 7.502 10.755 300
Indicators of Financial Development
Private credit 0.742 0.685 0.479 0.079 2.223 300
Banking credit 0.674 0.567 0.439 0.066 2.223 300
Domestic credit 0.756 0.651 0.495 0.115 2.359 300
Liquidity 0.690 0.602 0.392 0.137 2.126 300
Banking crisis 0.23 0 0.422 0 1 300
Note: Five year average data reported. Patent: patent per 100 billion dollars. R&D:
R&D spending as percentage of GDP. IP: Index of protection for intellectual property
right. Obatained from [Park, 2008], the author updated data to 2015. WIPO: World
Intellectual Property Organization; WDI: World Development Indicators; UN-HDI: United
Nations Human Development Index; WBFSD: World Bank Financial Structure Database.
The financial development missing data for New Zealand is filled using data from Reserve
Bank of New Zealand(https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics). Banking Crisis is obtained from
[Laeven and Valencia, 2013], Systemic Banking Crises Database(1970-2011). The data from
2012 to 2016 are extended by the author by searching key words that indicates a banking cri-
sis for each country between 2012 and 2016. Key words includes bank run, bank crisis and
illiquidity.
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Figure 1.1: Financial development and innovation
Note: Countries are sorted according to the level of financial development(FD). This figure splits the countries into
two groups: low FD countries and high FD countries. Each group contains 25 countries. This figure uses patent as
proxy for innovation.
83
Table 1.2: Financial development and Innovation: 1990-2016
Dependent var: Percentage change in patents
Full MIC HIC LFD HFD
L.Patent 0.024 -0.258∗ 0.006 -0.273∗∗∗ -0.021
(0.073) (0.145) (0.049) (0.088) (0.064)
Private credit 0.353∗ 0.394∗∗ 0.183 0.837∗∗ 0.229
(0.181) (0.194) (0.158) (0.401) (0.153)
FDI 0.086 9.877 0.139∗∗∗ -0.975 -0.118
(0.082) (10.310) (0.048) (1.229) (0.344)
Population 0.019 0.161∗∗∗ 0.033 0.121∗∗ 0.004
(0.048) (0.060) (0.022) (0.060) (0.029)
GDP/capita 0.191 -0.275 0.194 0.452 0.109
(0.336) (0.553) (0.251) (0.347) (0.249)
Schooling -0.115∗∗ 0.080 -0.089∗∗∗ 0.015 -0.072
(0.046) (0.121) (0.027) (0.064) (0.054)
IP -0.039 -0.064 -0.092 -0.020 0.072
(0.133) (0.181) (0.074) (0.137) (0.121)
Obs 250 110 140 125 125
Countries 50 22 28 25 25
AR(2) test 0.130 0.232 0.392 0.250 0.215
Hansen J test 0.240 0.859 0.365 0.505 0.483
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are five years average val-
ues; Windmeijer correction method is applied for each regression; MIC: Middle income
countries; HIC: High income countries; LFD: Low financial development countries;
HFD: High financial development countries. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 1.3: Financial development, Innovation, and Growth: 1990-2016
Dependent var: Growth of GDP per capita
Full MIC HIC LFD HFD
L.Growth 0.170 -0.119 -0.246∗∗ 0.041 0.097
(0.366) (0.189) (0.098) (0.381) (0.183)
Patent 0.004∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.002 0.008∗∗ 0.001
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Govt -0.070 -0.262∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.122∗ -0.001
(0.043) (0.082) (0.042) (0.067) (0.046)
Trade 0.004∗ 0.004 0.006∗∗ 0.006 0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.010) (0.003) (0.010) (0.002)
Investment -0.029 -0.012 0.309∗∗∗ 0.057 0.153∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.117) (0.109) (0.075) (0.058)
Inflation -0.012 -0.001 0.005 -0.006 -0.120
(0.019) (0.032) (0.052) (0.029) (0.166)
Schooling 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Initial -0.009∗∗ -0.011 -0.023∗∗ -0.009 -0.013∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004)
Obs 250 110 140 125 125
Countries 50 22 28 25 25
AR(2) test 0.236 0.120 0.145 0.152 0.433
Hansen J test 0.187 0.667 0.148 0.357 0.126
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All variables are five years average values;
Windmeijer correction method applied for each regression; MIC: Middle income coun-
tries; HIC: High income countries; LFD: Low financial development countries; HFD:
High financial development countries. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 1.4: The effect of innovation on growth with level of financial development:1990-2016
Dependent var: Growth rate of GDP per capita
Private credit Banking credit Domestic credit Liquidity
L.Growth -0.009 0.026 -0.001 -0.011
(0.113) (0.287) (0.104) (0.153)
Patent 0.012∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
FD*Patent -0.006∗∗ -0.006∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.005∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Govt -0.066 -0.028 -0.095∗ -0.056
(0.051) (0.057) (0.050) (0.042)
Trade 0.005 0.009∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Investment 0.096 0.078 0.092 0.116
(0.067) (0.067) (0.061) (0.082)
Inflation -0.075 -0.056 -0.072 -0.056
(0.063) (0.055) (0.059) (0.042)
Schooling 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Initial -0.007∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Obs 250 250 250 250
Countries 50 50 50 50
AR(2) test 0.152 0.173 0.172 0.119
Hansen J test 0.918 0.769 0.956 0.598
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All variables are five years average values; Windmeijer correction
method is applied for each regression; FD is the indicators of financial development, it includes Bank-
ing credit, private credit, liquidity liability, and domestic credit. FD*Patent is the interaction between
financial development and patent. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 1.5: Financial development in crisis and tranquil period
Vars Ave. (BC=1) Ave. (BC=0) diff standard error t-statistics p-value
PC1 0.90 0.67 -0.23∗∗∗ 0.056 -4.019 0.000
PC2 0.83 0.61 -0.22∗∗∗ 0.052 -4.217 0.000
LL 0.75 0.64 -0.11∗∗ 0.045 -2.204 0.027
DC 0.92 0.71 -0.21∗∗∗ 0.041 -5.037 0.000
Notes: PC1 refers to private credit by banks and other financial institutions(%GDP); PC2 refers to pri-
vate credit by deposite money banks(%GDP); LL is liquidity liability(%GDP). DC is domestic private
credit(%GDP). BC is short for banking crisis, it equals to 1 if there is banking crisis event in that year, and
0 if otherwise. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 1.6: Banking crisis, innovation, and growth:1990-2016
Dependent var: Growth rate
(1) (2) (3)
L.Growth 0.520 0.363 0.087
(0.368) (0.283) (0.201)
Patent 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
BC -0.002 -0.010 0.000
(0.031) (0.032) (0.030)
BC*Patent -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)












Obs 250 250 250
Countries 50 50 50
AR(2) test 0.618 0.538 0.115
Hansen J test 0.532 0.603 0.152
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All variables are five
years average values; Windmeijer correction method is applied
for each regression; BC is short for banking crisis, it equals to 1
if there is banking crisis event in that year, and 0 if otherwise.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 1.7: Impact of financial crisis and European debt crisis on innovation recovery:2009-2016
High income Middle income High QOG Low QOG
Panel A: Innovation resilience post 2007-2008 financial crisis
Sinking ratio 39.2% 22.7% 38.4% 25%
Ave. years to recover 0.50 1.43 0.43 1.39
Ave. years of first turning point 0.34 0.33 0.28 0.24
Ratio of negative growth since 2010 67.86% 50% 69.23% 50%
Panel B: Financial development since 2010(mean values)
Banking credit 94.31% 39.47% 101.93% 39.23%
Private credit 102% 44.05% 112.91% 43.79%
Liquidity 89.18% 52% 92.26% 51.99%
Domestic credit 99.26% 45.71% 112.39% 44.71%
Note: Financial crisis between 2007 and 2008. Take year 2009 as the initial year post crisis. Sinking ratio is defined as the
ratio of countries whose innovation level do not recover back to its pre-crisis level through the period examined in our sample;
Average years to recover refers to the average years needed to return back to pre-crisis level for those recovery countries;
Average years of first turning point calculates the average years needed for the first positive growth of innovation
post crisis. Ratio of negative growth since 2010 measures the ratio of countries with negative average growth rate of
innovation since 2010. Pre-crisis innovation level are calculated as the average innovation level of 2005 and 2006.
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Table 1.8: The impact of post financial crisis and european sovereign debt crisis on innovation
Dependent var: Growth of patent
Private credit Banking credit Domestic credit Liquidity
L.Patent -0.116 -0.122 -0.122 -0.028
(0.100) (0.109) (0.098) (0.055)
LC 0.133 0.104 0.093 0.126
(0.144) (0.140) (0.122) (0.111)
FD 0.472∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.187
(0.129) (0.114) (0.143) (0.186)
LC*FD -0.266∗∗ -0.271∗∗ -0.200∗ -0.254∗∗
(0.135) (0.133) (0.111) (0.126)
FDI 0.305 0.365 0.309 -0.386
(0.427) (0.418) (0.421) (0.573)
Population 0.066 0.088 0.066 0.032
(0.075) (0.080) (0.082) (0.066)
GDP/capita 0.374 0.395 0.412 0.146
(0.428) (0.489) (0.486) (0.372)
Schooling -0.079 -0.065 -0.082 -0.046
(0.062) (0.066) (0.065) (0.062)
IP -0.049 -0.054 -0.049 0.024
(0.090) (0.092) (0.094) (0.090)
Obs 250 250 250 250
Countries 50 50 50 50
AR(2) test 0.121 0.105 0.112 0.118
Hansen J test 0.542 0.670 0.566 0.664
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are five years average values; Windmeijer
correction method is applied for each regression; FD is the indicators of financial development, it includes
Banking credit, private credit, liquidity liability, and domestic credit. LC is a dummy equals to 1 if after
2009, and it is 0 if otherwise. LC*FD is the interaction between financial development and LC. ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 1.9: Ruling out the the impact of post financial crisis and european sovereign debt crisis on
innovation: 1990-2009
Dependent var: Growth of GDP per capita
Full MIC HIC LFD HFD
L.Growth 0.188 -0.013 -0.300∗∗ -0.162 -0.081
(0.354) (0.239) (0.146) (0.141) (0.345)
Patent 0.003∗ 0.014∗∗∗ -0.006 0.005∗∗ -0.000
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Govt -0.021 -0.173 0.041 -0.040 0.079
(0.031) (0.129) (0.104) (0.061) (0.061)
Trade 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.004
(0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
Investment 0.092 -0.113 0.693∗ 0.035 0.265∗∗
(0.131) (0.086) (0.401) (0.103) (0.111)
Inflation -0.002 0.029 -0.027 0.003 -0.058
(0.015) (0.025) (0.088) (0.019) (0.096)
Schooling 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Initial -0.009∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.010∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004)
Obs 150 66 84 75 75
Countries 50 22 28 25 25
AR(2) test 0.236 0.089 0.242 0.106 0.221
Hansen J test 0.183 0.518 0.741 0.543 0.127
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are five years average
values; Windmeijer correction method is applied for each regression. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 1.10: Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis: Innovation regression
Private credit Banking credit Domestic credit Liquidity
Threshold(γ̂) 0.480∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.044) (0.033) (0.130)
Financial development
β̂L(FD ≤ γ) 1.339∗∗∗ 1.246∗∗∗ 1.184∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗
(0.237) (0.219) (0.215) (0.176)
β̂H(FD > γ) 0.030 0.096 -0.060 -0.345
∗∗∗
(0.234) (0.218) (0.204) (0.109)
L.Patent 0.632∗∗∗ 0.596∗∗∗ 0.603∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.039) (0.029) (0.038)
FDI -0.048∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.024∗ -0.034
(0.026) (0.033) (0.010) (0.022)
Population 0.048 0.095 0.230 -0.109
(0.444) (0.327) (0.169) (0.319)
GDP/capita 0.302∗∗∗ 0.359∗ 0.069 0.486∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.097) (0.106) (0.094)
IP 0.259∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.044) (0.032) (0.038)
Schooling -0.037 -0.031 0.023∗∗∗ 0.032
(0.025) (0.025) (0.007) (0.028)
Obs 250 250 250 250
Countries 50 50 50 50
Linearity test(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 0.497 0.310 0.234 0.14
J(p-value) 0.94 0.94 0.36 0.94
Note: The null of linearity test is H0: β̂L = β̂H . m2 tests for lack of second order serial correlation in the residuals.
If this test rejects the null hypothesis, then the moment restrictions are not valid and the GMM estimator will be
inconsistent. The J test is a specification test which means that if it rejects, either the orthogonality conditions,
or other assumptions, or both are false. Robust standard errors in the parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table 1.11: Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis: Growth regression
Private credit Banking credit Domestic credit Liquidity
Threshold(γ̂) 0.584∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.577∗∗∗ 1.367∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.023) (0.032) (0.067)
Innovation
β̂L(FD≤γ) 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.006∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
β̂H(FD>γ) -0.008
∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
L.Growth -0.440∗∗∗ -0.479∗∗∗ -0.380∗∗∗ -0.392∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.037) (0.018) (0.031)
Schooling 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Govt -0.514∗∗∗ -0.733∗∗∗ -0.572∗∗∗ -0.936∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.072) (0.074) (0.082)
Investment 0.221∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.018) (0.013) (0.017)
Trade 0.013∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Inflation 0.004 0.005 -0.011 -0.033∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011)
Obs 250 250 250 250
Countries 50 50 50 50
Linearity test(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 0.03 0.05 0.15 0.04
J(p-value) 0.36 0.94 0.36 0.99
Note: The null of linearity test is H0: β̂L = β̂H . m2 tests for lack of second order serial correlation in the residuals.
If this test rejects the null hypothesis, then the moment restrictions are not valid and the GMM estimator will be
inconsistent. The J test is a specification test which means that if it rejects, either the orthogonality conditions,
or other assumptions, or both are false. Robust standard errors in the parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table 1.12: Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis: Growth regression without interaction between finance
and patent
Private credit Banking credit Domestic credit Liquidity
Threshold(γ̂) 0.591∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗ 0.611∗∗∗ 0.730∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.033) (0.025) (0.252)
Financial development
β̂L(FD≤γ) 0.034∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.086∗
(0.015) (0.008) (0.010) (0.047)
β̂H(FD>γ) -0.056
∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.015) (0.006) (0.008) (0.027)
L.Growth -0.271∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗ -0.312∗∗∗ -0.034
(0.027) (0.055) (0.043) (0.103)
Schooling 0.005∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.002 -0.009∗
(0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
Govt -0.004∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.001 -0.005
(0.000) (0.004) (0.026) (0.006)
Investment 0.069∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.109
(0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.075)
Trade -0.006 0.025∗∗∗ 0.027 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.023)
Inflation -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009)
Obs 250 250 250 250
Countries 50 50 50 50
Linearity test(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.029
J(p-value) 0.36 0.94 0.94 0.03
Note: The null of linearity test is H0: β̂L = β̂H . m2 tests for lack of second order serial correlation in the residuals.
If this test rejects the null hypothesis, then the moment restrictions are not valid and the GMM estimator will be
inconsistent. The J test is a specification test which means that if it rejects, either the orthogonality conditions,




Figure 1.A1: Credit Expansion and Banking Crisis
Note: Shaded area indicates a banking crisis in that year. Original database on Banking Crisis is obtained from
[Laeven and Valencia, 2013], Systemic Banking Crises Database(1970-2011). The data from 2012 to 2016 are extended
by the author by searching key words that indicates a banking crisis for each country between 2012 and 2016. Key






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.A2: Robustness checks for growth regression (2): 1990-2016
Dependent var: Growth rate of GDP per capita
Banking credit Domestic credit Liquidity
LFD HFD LFD HFD LFD HFD
L.Growth -0.097 0.218 0.041 0.097 -0.135 0.080
(0.252) (0.194) (0.381) (0.183) (0.276) (0.252)
Patent 0.010∗∗∗ -0.006 0.008∗∗ 0.001 0.008∗∗ 0.003
(0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Govt -0.078 -0.010 -0.122∗ -0.001 -0.091∗ -0.037
(0.066) (0.085) (0.067) (0.046) (0.052) (0.067)
Trade 0.008 0.002 0.006 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001 0.006
(0.007) (0.003) (0.010) (0.002) (0.011) (0.004)
Investment 0.072 0.075 0.057 0.153∗∗∗ 0.089 0.156
(0.054) (0.112) (0.075) (0.058) (0.067) (0.114)
Inflation -0.019 -0.222 -0.006 -0.120 -0.026 0.113
(0.040) (0.262) (0.029) (0.166) (0.038) (0.095)
Schooling -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Initial -0.011∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.013∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗ -0.011∗
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Obs 125 125 125 125 125 125
Countries 25 25 25 25 25 25
AR(2) test 0.154 0.413 0.152 0.433 0.127 0.239
Hansen J test 0.512 0.151 0.357 0.126 0.268 0.102
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All variables are five years average values; Windmeijer
correction method applied for each regression; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Figure 1.A2: Kernel density of four indicators of financial development
Note: Estimated density of indicators of financial development using Epanechnikov kernal density
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Table 1.A3: Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis: Innovation regression (R&D)
Dependent var: R&D (% of GDP)
Private credit Banking credit Domestic credit Liquidity
Threshold(γ̂) 0.443∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.610∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.095) (0.085) (0.156)
Financial development
β̂L(FD ≤ γ) 1.157∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗ 1.319∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗
(0.210) (0.159) (0.367) (0.092)
β̂H(FD > γ) -0.054 0.145 0.196 0.016
(0.039) (0.149) (0.352) (0.160)
L.R&D 0.398∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.055) (0.066) (0.033)
FDI -0.016 -0.274 -0.034∗ -0.001
(0.282) (0.265) (0.018) (0.026)
Population 0.171 -0.140 0.569∗ -0.254
(0.126) (0.263) (0.322) (0.226)
GDP/capita -0.012 0.164 0.029 0.127∗∗
(0.026) (0.109) (0.106) (0.065)
IP 0.036 -0.214 0.015 0.072∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.260) (0.019) (0.024)
Schooling 0.119∗∗ 0.026 0.061∗∗∗ 0.019
(0.054) (0.027) (0.017) (0.019)
Obs 230 230 230 230
Countries 46 46 46 46
Linearity test(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 0.13 0.12 0.1 0.16
J(p-value) 1 1 0.99 0.99
Note: The null of linearity test is H0: β̂L = β̂H . m2 tests for lack of second order serial correlation in the residuals.
If this test rejects the null hypothesis, then the moment restrictions are not valid and the GMM estimator will be
inconsistent. The J test is a specification test which means that if it rejects, either the orthogonality conditions,
or other assumptions, or both are false. Robust standard errors in the parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table 1.A4: Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis: Growth regression (R&D)
Private credit Banking credit Domestic credit Liquidity
Threshold(γ̂) 0.531∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.047) (0.029) (0.010)
R&D
β̂L(FD≤γ) 0.058∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.076)
β̂H(FD>γ) -0.014
∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.007
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.076)
L.Growth -0.365∗∗∗ -0.468∗∗∗ -0.313∗∗∗ -0.375∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.041) (0.041) (0.037)
Schooling 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0037∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0012
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Govt -0.193∗∗∗ -0.4471∗∗∗ -0.411∗∗∗ -0.494∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.092) (0.116) (0.087)
Investment 0.193∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.013) (0.022) (0.023)
Trade 0.0066 0.013∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Inflation -0.026∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.0058 -0.077∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008)
Obs 230 230 230 230
Countries 46 46 46 46
Linearity test(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.17
J(p-value) 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99
Note: The null of linearity test is H0: β̂L = β̂H . m2 tests for lack of second order serial correlation in the residuals.
If this test rejects the null hypothesis, then the moment restrictions are not valid and the GMM estimator will be
inconsistent. The J test is a specification test which means that if it rejects, either the orthogonality conditions,
or other assumptions, or both are false. Robust standard errors in the parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table 1.A5: Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis: Growth regression (Utility models)
Private credit Banking credit Domestic credit Liquidity
Threshold(γ̂) 0.592∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.986∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.027) (0.268) (0.067)
Innovation
β̂L(FD≤γ) 0.019∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.006∗ -0.023∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
β̂H(FD>γ) -0.007
∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
L.Growth -0.502∗∗∗ -0.511∗∗∗ -0.418∗∗∗ -0.301∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.037) (0.029) (0.075)
Schooling 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Govt -0.532∗∗∗ -0.710∗∗∗ -0.515∗∗∗ -0.236
(0.087) (0.079) (0.071) (0.195)
Investment 0.202∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.018) (0.022) (0.092)
Trade 0.013∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ -0.021
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.017)
Inflation 0.012∗∗ 0.011 -0.007 -0.013
(0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.010)
Obs 245 245 245 245
Countries 49 49 49 49
Linearity test(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.11
J(p-value) 0.95 0.95 0.99 0.14
Note: The null of linearity test is H0: β̂L = β̂H . m2 tests for lack of second order serial correlation in the residuals.
If this test rejects the null hypothesis, then the moment restrictions are not valid and the GMM estimator will be
inconsistent. The J test is a specification test which means that if it rejects, either the orthogonality conditions,
or other assumptions, or both are false. Robust standard errors in the parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table 1.A6: Threshold estimation using quadratic and [Kremer et al., 2013] method: Innovation regression
Private credit Banking credit Liquidity Domestic credit
Nonlinear test using quadratic regression
L.Patent -0.092 -0.084 0.020 -0.118
(0.070) (0.074) (0.099) (0.080)
FD 1.906∗∗ 1.303∗∗ 1.407∗∗ 2.137∗∗∗
(0.855) (0.506) (0.694) (0.822)
FD2 -0.774∗ -0.513∗∗ -0.810∗ -0.939∗∗
(0.416) (0.214) (0.463) (0.418)
FDI -0.035 -0.010 0.089 -0.102
(0.084) (0.079) (0.291) (0.159)
Population 0.004 0.005 0.038 0.006
(0.054) (0.044) (0.084) (0.056)
GDP/capita 0.119 0.191 0.231 0.308
(0.220) (0.218) (0.343) (0.315)
Schooling -0.147∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗ -0.152∗ -0.210∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.039) (0.086) (0.063)
IP 0.123 0.157 0.125 0.232∗
(0.151) (0.163) (0.187) (0.133)
cons -0.576 -0.915 -2.502 -2.201
(2.378) (2.327) (4.007) (3.179)
Obs 250 250 250 250
Country 50 50 50 50
AR(2) test 0.140 0.137 0.116 0.132
Hansen J test 0.411 0.409 0.435 0.930
Lind and Mehlum U-shape test
dY/dFD = 0 1.231 1.268 0.868 1.137
P-value 0.065 0.022 0.062 0.028
Threshold test using Kremer et al(2013) method
Threshold estimates
γ̂ 1.378 1.333 1.649 1.660
95% CI [1.207 3.057] [1.207 1.646] [1.289 1.782] [1.219 1.717]
Impact of FD
β̂L 0.664
∗∗ 0.854∗∗ 0.326 0.341∗∗
(0.334) (0.359) (0.24) (0.147)
β̂H 0.038 0.019 -0.008 0.044
∗
(0.027) (0.026) (0.049) (0.025)
Impact of covariates
L.Patent 0.065∗∗ 0.041 0.028 0.04
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.03)
FDI 0.031 0.037 0.042 0.035
(0.067) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064)
GDP/capita -0.105∗ -0.073 -0.061 -0.085∗
(0.055) (0.053) (0.054) (0.051)
Population 0.064 0.113 0.092 0.052
(0.147) (0.152) (0.158) (0.156)
Schooling -0.045∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
IP 0.067∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015)
δ̂ -0.116 -0.151 -0.074 -0.035
(0.093) (0.088) (0.106) (0.064)
Obs 300 300 300 300
Country 50 50 50 50
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are five years average values; Windmeijer
correction method is applied for each regression; FD is the indicators of financial development,
it includes Banking credit, private credit, liquidity liability, and domestic credit. * (p<0.1), **
(p<0.05), *** (p<0.01).
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Table 1.A7: Variable Definitions and Sources
Variables Definition Source
Patent Resident applications per 100 billion USD GDP(2011 PPP)(by applicant’s
origin), natural log of patent
WIPO
Utility models Resident applications per 100 billion USD GDP(by applicant’s origin), nat-
ural log of utility models
Authors’ construction
from WIPO
R&D Gross domestic spending on R&D as percentage of GDP OECD&UNESCO
FDI Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) WDI, World Bank
GDP/capita GDP per capita(2011 PPP), natural log of GDP per capita WDI, World Bank
Population Total population ages 15-64, natural log of total population WDI, World Bank
Schooling Average number of years of education received by people ages 25 and older UN-HDI
IP Intelectual property right protection index (five years average) Park’s IP database
Growth rate GDP per capita growth (annual %) WDI, World Bank
Govt General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) WDI, World Bank
Trade Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as
a share of gross domestic product(% of GDP).
WDI, World Bank
Investment Gross capital formation (% of GDP) WDI, World Bank
Inflation Inflation as measured by the annual percentage change in consumer price
index reflects(%)
WDI, World Bank
Initial GDP/capita Initial GDP per capita, natural log of GDP per capita WDI, World Bank
Private credit Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to
GDP.
WBFSD, World Bank
Banking credit The financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money
banks as a share of GDP.
WBFSD, World Bank
Domestic credit Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided to
the private sector((% of GDP)).
WBFSD, World Bank
Liquidity Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. Liquid liabilities are also known as broad
money, or M3.
WBFSD, World Bank
Banking crisis A dummy variable is defined as 1 if there is banking crisis in the year, and
0 otherwise
Laeven et al.(2013) and
authors’ construction
Note: Index of protection for intellectual property right is obatained from [Park, 2008], the author updates the data to 2015.
WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization; UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization;
WDI: World Development Indicators; UN-HDI: United Nations Human Development Index; WBFSD: World Bank Financial
Structure Database. The financial development missing data for New Zealand is filled using data from Reserve Bank of New
Zealand(https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics). Banking Crisis is obtained from [Laeven and Valencia, 2013], Systemic Banking
Crises Database(1970-2011). The data from 2012 to 2016 are extended by the author by searching key words that indicates a
banking crisis for each country between 2012 and 2016. Key words includes bank run, bank crisis and illiquidity.
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CREDIT EXPANSION, INNOVATION, AND BANKING CRISIS
This appendix provides a robustness check on the diminishing effect of credit expan-
sion on innovation. In our sample, banking crisis follows closely the credit expansions.
Figure A1 in the appendix shows the evolution of private credit for U.S., UK, Japan,
Malaysia, and China. For each country showed here, banking crisis occurred when
credits expand. For example, Malaysia experienced banking crisis between 1997-1998,
during which period the private credit level is the highest of all the period in our sam-
ple. Table 5 gives the difference in financial development between crisis and tranquil
period. On average, the level of private credit is significantly higher than in tranquil
period. Banking crisis may affect innovation performance and investments via several
mechanisms([Döner, 2017],[OECD, 2012]). Crisis causes a reduction in the demand
for products, this would dampen the incentives to innovate. Firms may suffer from
credit constraints and difficulties in accessing finance during banking crisis. Risky
Activities such as R&D are seriously affected. Another dark side is the increased
uncertainties as to future developments. This pro-cyclic pattern of R&D and innova-
tion has been observed over various business cycles and for a variety of countries(e.g.
[Comin and Gertler, 2006], [Francois and Lloyd-Ellis, 2008]). It is therefore necessary
to examine whether the diminishing effect of financial development on innovation is
independent of the negative effect of banking crisis.
We consider the following DID strategy
innovationit = ρinnovationit−1 + αBCit + βFDit + δBCit ∗ FDit + γXit + µi + τt + vit
where BCit is the dummy for banking crisis for country i at year t. The value is 1
if there is banking crisis at period t, and equals to 0 for tranquil period. δ measures
the differential effect of finance on innovation between crisis and tranquil period. The
expected sign of δ is non-negative.
Table A8 shows the results using different indicators of financial development. For
all four indicators, the overall effect of financial development on innovation is positive.
As expected, the sign on banking crisis is negative, although not significant. The co-
efficient of interest is the interaction term between financial development and banking
crisis, which measures the differential effect of financial development on innovation
between crisis and tranquil period. Our results show that the effects of financial de-
velopment do not make any differences between the two states. This suggests that
the diminishing effect of financial development is not caused by banking crisis.
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Table 1.A8: Credit expansion, banking crisis, and innovation:1990-2016
Dependent var: Percentage change in patents
Banking credit Private credit Liquidity Domestic credit
L.Patent -0.377∗∗ -0.295∗ -0.280∗∗ -0.334∗∗
(0.165) (0.162) (0.121) (0.135)
BC -0.085 -0.089 -0.053 -0.087
(0.099) (0.088) (0.084) (0.092)
FD 0.565∗∗ 0.472∗ 0.467∗ 0.483∗
(0.254) (0.261) (0.277) (0.259)
FD*BC -0.116 -0.012 -0.221 -0.019
(0.232) (0.209) (0.394) (0.260)
FDI 0.007 0.005 -0.005 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Population 0.130∗∗ 0.069 0.108∗∗ 0.071
(0.059) (0.062) (0.049) (0.051)
GDP/capita 0.146 0.129 0.835∗∗ 0.095
(0.302) (0.329) (0.390) (0.282)
Schooling 0.396 -0.062 -0.807 0.165
(0.925) (0.833) (0.588) (0.735)
IP 0.338 0.457 0.083 0.510
(0.553) (0.545) (0.727) (0.471)
Obs 250 250 250 250
Countries 50 50 50 50
AR(2) test 0.192 0.120 0.151 0.145
Hansen J test 0.435 0.372 0.695 0.452
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables 5 years average values; Windmeijer correction
method is applied for each regression; FD is the indicators of financial development, it includes Banking
credit, private credit, liquidity liability, and domestic credit. BC is the dummy of banking crisis. FD*BC
is the interaction between financial development and banking crisis. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Figure 1.A3: The Multi-factor Productivity Growth Rate in G7 Group: 1985-2017
Note: Annual trend growth rates are obtained using HP filter, the smooth parameter is set as 6.25.
Data source: OECD (2019), Multifactor productivity (indicator).
Table 1.A9: The Multi-factor Productivity Growth Rate in G7 Group: 5 years average
Years
1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2017
Canada 0.158 .477 1.045 0.697 -0.077 0.820
Germany 1.378 1.821 1.041 0.814 0.029 1.116
France 1.925 0.744 1.142 0.997 -0.347 0.422
UK 1.151 1.072 1.657 1.992 -0.151 0.300
Italy 1.452 0.731 0.448 -0.128 -1.103 0.285
Japan 2.780 0.787 0.672 1.008 -0.370 1.177
USA 0.732 0.842 1.091 1.623 0.580 0.446
Note: Data source: OECD (2019), Multifactor productivity (indicator).
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Figure 2.1: Time series trend of Research Quotient by SIC
Note: Figure 2.1 shows the country average RQ trend by SIC code. The value in each industry-year pair is calculated as
the average of all countries. 20 Food & Kindred Products; 21 Tobacco Products; 22 Textile Mill Products; 23 Apparel
& Other Textile Products; 24 Lumber & Wood Products; 25 Furniture & Fixtures; 26 Paper & Allied Products; 27
Printing & Publishing; 28 Chemical & Allied Products; 29 Petroleum & Coal Products; 30 Rubber & Miscellaneous
Plastics Products; 31 Leather & Leather Products; 32 Stone, Clay, & Glass Products; 33 Primary Metal Industries;
34 Fabricated Metal Products; 35 Industrial Machinery & Equipment; 36 Electronic & Other Electric Equipment; 37
Transportation Equipment; 38 Instruments & Related Products; 39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics:country-level averages
Country RQ U.S ref Competition EFD
Australia 0.145 79.23% 0.971 -0.641
Austria 0.161 87.97% 0.959 0.098
Belgium 0.140 76.50% 0.942 -0.290
Brazil 0.193 105.46% 0.891 -1.877
Canada 0.157 85.79% 0.967 0.477
Chile 0.085 46.44% 0.934 -0.887
China 0.154 82.51% 0.895 -0.138
Denmark 0.161 87.97% 0.922 -0.665
Egypt 0.177 96.72% 0.884 -1.557
Finland 0.173 94.53% 0.942 -0.321
France 0.177 96.72% 0.934 -0.279
Germany 0.163 89.07% 0.953 -0.432
Greece 0.138 75.41% 0.962 0.221
Hong Kong 0.144 78.68% 0.936 -0.667
India 0.153 83.60% 0.921 -0.174
Indonesia 0.138 75.41% 0.904 -0.309
Isreal 0.146 79.78% 0.954 -0.009
Italy 0.148 80.87% 0.948 -0.616
Japan 0.167 91.25% 0.955 -0.151
Jordan 0.173 94.53% 0.939 -0.991
Korea 0.127 69.39% 0.941 -0.156
Malaysia 0.149 81.42% 0.917 -1.115
Mexico 0.132 72.13% 0.927 -1.939
Netherland 0.173 94.53% 0.936 -0.057
Norway 0.175 95.62% 0.958 0.031
Pakistan 0.113 71.03% 0.925 -1.048
Philippines 0.137 74.86% 0.936 -1.698
Poland 0.137 74.86% 0.931 0.008
Romania 0.106 57.92% 0.970 -0.059
Russia 0.120 65.57% 0.956 -0.184
Saudi Arabia 0.165 90.16% 0.893 -1.396
Singapore 0.174 95.08% 0.961 -0.205
South Africa 0.151 82.51% 0.920 -0.726
Spain 0.121 66.12% 0.936 -1.033
Sri Lanka 0.180 98.36% 0.926 -0.882
Sweden 0.166 90.71% 0.925 -0.546
Switzerland 0.171 93.44% 0.932 -0.101
Thailand 0.156 85.24% 0.945 -1.073
Turkey 0.138 75.41% 0.927 -0.630
United Kingdom 0.172 93.98% 0.924 -0.631
United States 0.183 100% 0.934 -0.476
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics: industry-level averages
Industry RQ Competition EFD
20 Food & Kindred Products 0.152 0.931 -0.616
21 Tobacco Products 0.175 0.849 -2.704
22 Textile Mill Products 0.156 0.948 -0.483
23 Apparel & Other Textile Products 0.157 0.932 -0.727
24 Lumber & Wood Products 0.135 0.942 -0.285
25 Furniture & Fixtures 0.171 0.946 -0.618
26 Paper & Allied Products 0.151 0.939 -0.465
27 Printing & Publishing 0.141 0.928 -1.450
28 Chemical & Allied Products 0.169 0.928 -0.261
29 Petroleum & Coal Products 0.184 0.943 -0.489
30 Rubber & Miscellaneous Plastics Products 0.151 0.938 -0.573
31 Leather & Leather Products 0.157 0.936 -0.689
32 Stone, Clay, & Glass Products 0.148 0.908 -0.593
33 Primary Metal Industries 0.153 0.950 -0.322
34 Fabricated Metal Products 0.158 0.927 -0.570
35 Industrial Machinery & Equipment 0.153 0.942 -0.371
36 Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 0.162 0.955 0.082
37 Transportation Equipment 0.156 0.952 -0.154
38 Instruments & Related Products 0.167 0.938 0.413
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 0.153 0.946 -0.775
109
Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics: country-industry-year averages
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
RQ 0.158 0.059 0.05 0.278 9288
Competition 0.937 0.063 0.811 1.085 11676
EFD -0.466 1.181 -3.693 1.561 12190
Value Added(log) 21.644 2.476 17.136 26.041 11802
Capitalization(%GDP) 73.226 49.08 14.857 200.384 12900
Total Value(%GDP) 55.191 52.577 3.321 197.175 13079
Turnover Ratio 74.419 52.356 10.889 198.901 13022
Private Credit(%GDP) 92.47 45.115 21.037 175.307 12733
Liquid Liabilities (%GDP) 83.328 44.026 31.702 195.965 12651
Deposit Credit(%GDP) 81.755 40.376 20.755 163.847 12723
Financial Development Index 0.611 0.186 0.126 1 13745
Financial Market Index 0.551 0.21 0.014 1 13745
FM Depth Index 0.554 0.279 0.018 1 13745
FM Access Index 0.487 0.235 0.001 1 13745
FM Efficiency Index 0.608 0.314 0.002 1 13742
Financial Institution Index 0.657 0.199 0.155 1 13745
FI Depth Index 0.588 0.268 0.051 1 13745
FI Access Index 0.545 0.267 0.043 1 13745
FI Efficiency Index 0.732 0.127 0.107 0.935 13745
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Table 2.4: Effect of FD on RQ: Capturing the intuition
Financial Development Measured As
Capitalization Value traded Turn over Total Private Liquidity Deposit credit
FD -0.023∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012)
FD2 -0.001 0.010∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.023∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Competition -1.867∗∗∗ -1.826∗∗∗ -1.858∗∗∗ -1.867∗∗∗ -1.814∗∗∗ -1.815∗∗∗
(0.250) (0.246) (0.246) (0.250) (0.250) (0.249)
Competition2 0.964∗∗∗ 0.945∗∗∗ 0.961∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗ 0.937∗∗∗ 0.935∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.127) (0.130) (0.131) (0.132) (0.131)
Value add 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cons 6.484∗∗∗ 6.492∗∗∗ 6.725∗∗∗ 6.484∗∗∗ 6.764∗∗∗ 6.637∗∗∗
(0.256) (0.258) (0.242) (0.256) (0.275) (0.244)
N 8254 8425 8385 8254 8174 8250
adj. R2 0.244 0.238 0.240 0.244 0.237 0.248
Industry effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-year effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Control credit market yes yes yes
Control equity market yes yes yes
Table 2.4 reports Panel fixed effect regressions with industrial level research quotient as dependent variable. The industrial
level data are constructed from the Worldscope Database and are aggregated from the firm level data by the 2-digit SIC code.
Only manufacturing industries (SIC 20-39) are included. The industrial level RQ is calculated as the median of all values
among all firms within an industry at a given year. All measures of financial development used are first order lagged value;
Value added is the first order lagged value. The credit market controlled is the total percentage of private credit to GDP. The
equity market controlled is the percentage of stock market capitalization to GDP. Standard errors calculated with clustering
at the country level are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.5: Effect of FD on RQ: RZ specification
Financial Development Measured As
Capitalization Value traded Turn over Total Private Liquidity Deposit credit
FD*EFD -0.023∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.013∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
FD2*EFD 0.012∗∗∗ -0.003 0.005∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Competition -1.682∗∗∗ -1.718∗∗∗ -1.628∗∗∗ -1.718∗∗∗ -1.682∗∗∗ -1.729∗∗∗
(0.250) (0.241) (0.250) (0.250) (0.253) (0.254)
Competition2 0.869∗∗∗ 0.893∗∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗ 0.893∗∗∗ 0.869∗∗∗ 0.894∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.133) (0.134)
Value add 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cons 6.737∗∗∗ 6.723∗∗∗ 6.677∗∗∗ 6.723∗∗∗ 6.737∗∗∗ 6.759∗∗∗
(0.212) (0.209) (0.211) (0.209) (0.212) (0.211)
N 8044 8253 8139 8253 8004 8080
adj. R2 0.233 0.238 0.232 0.238 0.233 0.238
Industry effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-year effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Control credit market yes yes yes
Control equity market yes yes yes
Optimal threshold 0.958 1.300 0.750 0.906 0.667
Table 2.5 reports Panel fixed effect RZ regressions with industrial level research quotient as dependent variable. The industrial
level data are constructed from the Worldscope Database and are aggregated from the firm level data by the 2-digit SIC code.
Only manufacturing industries (SIC 20-39) are included. The industrial level RQ is calculated as the median of all values
among all firms within an industry at a given year. All measures of financial development used are first order lagged value;
Value added is the first order lagged value. The credit market controlled is the total percentage of private credit to GDP. The
equity market controlled is the percentage of stock market capitalization to GDP. The control variables are the interaction
between equity market(credit market) and external financing dependence, and the interaction between its square term and the
external financing dependence. Standard errors calculated with clustering at the country level are reported in parentheses. ∗



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.7: Effect of FD on Innovation: Using industry level patents
Industry-level patent counts(log)
Capitalization Value traded Turn over Total Private Liquidity Deposit credit
FD*EFD 0.005 -0.015∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ 0.004 0.024∗∗∗ -0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
FD2*EFD -0.007∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Competition 0.409∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗ 0.346∗∗ 0.364∗∗
(0.149) (0.148) (0.149) (0.149) (0.150) (0.149)
Competition2 -0.318∗∗ -0.338∗∗ -0.326∗∗ -0.299∗∗ -0.290∗ -0.301∗∗
(0.150) (0.149) (0.150) (0.151) (0.152) (0.151)
Value add 0.919∗∗∗ 0.905∗∗∗ 0.916∗∗∗ 0.918∗∗∗ 0.901∗∗∗ 0.918∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051)
cons -2.216 -5.191 -5.218 -13.004∗∗∗ -14.941∗∗∗ -12.846∗∗∗
(3.224) (3.161) (3.213) (3.234) (3.254) (3.247)
N 14936 15150 15003 14606 14440 14605
adj. R2 0.465 0.466 0.467 0.478 0.481 0.478
Control credit market yes yes yes
Control equity market yes yes yes
Industry effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-year effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Optimal threshold 0.441 0.633 0.308
Table 2.7 reports Panel fixed effect RZ regressions with industrial level patent counts(log) as dependent variable. The industrial
level data are constructed by combining the Compustat North America and Global Annual Database and are aggregated from
the firm level data by the 2-digit SIC code. Only manufacturing industries (SIC 20-39) are included. All measures of financial
development used are first order lagged value; Value added is the first order lagged value. The credit market controlled is
the total percentage of private credit to GDP. The equity market controlled is the percentage of stock market capitalization
to GDP. The control variables are the interaction between Equity Market(Credit Market) and external financing dependence,
and the interaction between its square term and the external financing dependence. Each regression excluds U.S. sample to
minimize the home bias. Standard errors calculated with clustering at the country level are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.8: Effect of FD on Innovation: Using citation-weighted patent
Industry-level patent counts(forward citation weighted)
Capitalization Value traded Turn over Total Private Liquidity Deposit credit
FD*EFD -0.017∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ 0.017∗ 0.078∗∗∗ -0.028
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.018)
FD2*EFD -0.004 0.024∗ 0.027∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ 0.016
(0.005) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009) (0.020) (0.020)
Competition 0.194 0.183 0.185 0.151 0.104 0.154
(0.284) (0.280) (0.283) (0.293) (0.299) (0.293)
Competition2 0.263 0.286 0.286 0.311 0.336 0.301
(0.295) (0.293) (0.296) (0.303) (0.308) (0.303)
Initial share 0.994∗∗∗ 0.961∗∗∗ 0.989∗∗∗ 1.016∗∗∗ 1.015∗∗∗ 1.020∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.083) (0.082)
cons 57.032∗∗∗ 53.071∗∗∗ 54.593∗∗∗ 48.479∗∗∗ 43.096∗∗∗ 49.266∗∗∗
(10.411) (10.087) (10.376) (10.698) (10.875) (10.866)
N 14936 15150 15003 14606 14440 14605
adj. R2 0.243 0.243 0.243 0.250 0.251 0.249
Controlling for credit market yes yes yes
Controlling for equity market yes yes yes
Industry effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-year effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Optimal threshold 1.375 1.018 0.283 0.322
Table 2.8 reports Panel fixed effect RZ regressions with industrial level forward citation weighted patent as dependent variable. The
industrial level data are constructed by combining the Compustat North America and Global Annual Database and are aggregated
from the firm level data by the 2-digit SIC code. Only manufacturing industries (SIC 20-39) are included. All measures of financial
development used are first order lagged value; Value added is the first order lagged value. The credit market controlled is the total
percentage of private credit to GDP. The equity market controlled is the percentage of stock market capitalization to GDP. The control
variables are the interaction between Equity Market(Credit Market) and external financing dependence, and the interaction between
its square term and the external financing dependence. Each regression excluds U.S. sample to minimize the home bias. Standard




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.2: Share of patents in high technology manufacturing industry: Selected countries
Note: Figure 2.2 shows the country’s share of patent counts in high technology manufacturing industry to the total
patents counts in the manufacturing sector at a given year. Based on [Kile and Phillips, 2009], SIC code 35, 36, and
38 are grouped as high technology manufacturing industries. The upper left panel is for China; The upper right panel
is for Japan; The bottom left panel is for Canada; and The bottom right panel is for France.
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Figure 2.3: Share of patents in high technology manufacturing industry: Global trend
Note: Figure 3 shows the global share of patent counts in high technology manufacturing industry to the total patents
counts in the manufacturing sector at a given year. Based on [Kile and Phillips, 2009], SIC code 35, 36, and 38 are
grouped as high technology manufacturing industries. This value is calculated as country average.
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Table 2.10: Effect of FD on Innovation: High tech VS. Non-high tech manufacturing industry
Innovation Measured as RQ
Financial Development Measured As
Panel A: SIC Sector 35, 36, and 38
Capitalization Value Traded Turn over Total Private Liquidity Deposit Credit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FD*EFD 0.027∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.014 0.013 -0.014
(0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011)
FD2*EFD -0.009∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ 0.001 0.004 -0.015∗ 0.003
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006)
Competition -0.863 -0.797 -0.954 -0.863 -1.091∗ -0.886
(0.587) (0.592) (0.592) (0.587) (0.581) (0.586)
Competition2 0.426 0.401 0.479 0.426 0.540∗ 0.437
(0.307) (0.309) (0.309) (0.307) (0.304) (0.307)
Value add 0.003∗ 0.002 0.002 0.003∗ 0.002∗ 0.003∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
cons 8.291∗∗∗ 7.876∗∗∗ 7.992∗∗∗ 8.291∗∗∗ 8.258∗∗∗ 8.314∗∗∗
(0.444) (0.446) (0.451) (0.444) (0.462) (0.446)
N 1239 1255 1251 1239 1231 1239
adj. R2 0.406 0.399 0.401 0.406 0.405 0.407
Optimal threshold 1.500 1.045
Panel B: Sector Not in SIC 35, 36, or 38
FD*EFD 0.004 -0.000 -0.000 0.008 0.028∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
FD2*EFD 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.010∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Competition -1.748∗∗∗ -1.710∗∗∗ -1.719∗∗∗ -1.748∗∗∗ -1.655∗∗∗ -1.713∗∗∗
(0.275) (0.271) (0.270) (0.275) (0.275) (0.276)
Competition2 0.916∗∗∗ 0.897∗∗∗ 0.901∗∗∗ 0.916∗∗∗ 0.864∗∗∗ 0.894∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.143) (0.142) (0.145) (0.145) (0.146)
Value add 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
cons 6.578∗∗∗ 6.442∗∗∗ 6.495∗∗∗ 6.578∗∗∗ 6.424∗∗∗ 6.452∗∗∗
(0.235) (0.234) (0.234) (0.235) (0.236) (0.234)
N 6845 6998 6968 6845 6773 6841
adj. R2 0.243 0.238 0.239 0.243 0.232 0.239
Optimal threshold 0.933 0.708
Industry effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-year effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Control Credit Market yes yes yes
Control Equity Market yes yes yes
Table 2.10 reports the Panel fixed effect regression by splitting the industries into high-technology and non-high-technology
manufacturing industries. The criterion upon which we based is the classification system developed by [Kile and Phillips, 2009].
The industrial level data are constructed from the Worldscope Database and are aggregated from the firm level data by the
2-digit SIC code. Only manufacturing industries (SIC 20-39) are included. The industrial level RQ is calculated as the median
of all values among all firms within an industry at a given year. All measures of financial development used are first order lagged
value; Value added is the first order lagged value. The credit market controlled is the total percentage of private credit to GDP.
The equity market controlled is the percentage of stock market capitalization to GDP. The control variable is the interaction
between credit market(equity market) and external financing dependence, and the interaction between its square term and the
external financing dependence. Standard errors calculated with clustering at the country level are reported in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.11: Effect of FD on Innovation: Cross-section regression
Financial development measured as
Capitalization Value traded Turn over Total Private Liquidity Deposit credit
FD*EFD 0.011∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.014∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
FD2*EFD -0.005 -0.011∗∗ -0.009∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.008∗ -0.009
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Competition -2.289 -2.138 -2.209 -2.314 -2.088 -2.229
(1.550) (1.591) (1.530) (1.564) (1.556) (1.553)
Competition2 1.187 1.113 1.145 1.201 1.076 1.155
(0.826) (0.845) (0.816) (0.833) (0.829) (0.827)
Value add 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
cons 1.159 1.085 1.120 1.172 1.071 1.132
(0.712) (0.733) (0.702) (0.720) (0.716) (0.714)
N 436 436 436 436 436 436
adj. R2 0.198 0.203 0.202 0.205 0.204 0.199
Controlling for credit market yes yes yes
Controlling for equity market yes yes yes
Industry effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Optimal threshold 0.727 0.833 0.714 0.937
Table 2.11 reports the Panel fixed effect regression by using the average industry level data. The industrial level data are constructed
from the Worldscope Database and are aggregated from the firm level data by the 2-digit SIC code. Only manufacturing industries
(SIC 20-39) are included. The industrial level RQ is calculated as the median of all value among all firms within an industry at a
given year. All measures of financial development used are first order lagged value; Value added is the first order lagged value. The
credit market controlled is the total percentage of private credit to GDP. The equity market controlled is the percentage of stock
market capitalization to GDP. The control variable is the interaction between credit market(equity market) and external financing
dependence, and the interaction between its square term and the external financing dependence. Standard errors calculated with
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Figure 2.4 illustrates the potential channel through which Financial Development affects Innovation in a
nonlinear manner. The basic idea is that as financial system develops, it imposes a nonlinear effect on market
competition, thus generating nonlinear effect on innovation.
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Table 2.13: Financial development and market competition
Capitalization Value traded Turn over Total Private Liquidity Deposit credit
Panel A: Worldscope database
FD*EFD 0.024∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
FD2*EFD -0.008∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Initial share -0.042∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗
(top 10 firms) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
cons -0.887∗∗∗ -1.164∗∗∗ -1.035∗∗∗ -0.564∗∗∗ -0.495∗∗∗ -0.487∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.154) (0.156) (0.155) (0.156) (0.154)
N 8211 8370 8331 8200 8120 8191
adj. R2 0.238 0.232 0.227 0.219 0.217 0.220
Industry effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-year effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Optimal threshold 1.500 1.500 1.278 1.428 1.083 0.967
Panel B: Merged Compustat Global Fundamentals Annual database
FD*EFD 0.002∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ -0.000 0.003∗∗ -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
FD2*EFD -0.000 -0.010∗∗∗ -0.001 0.001 -0.003∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Initial share -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012
(top 10 firms) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
cons -21.607∗∗∗ -20.747∗∗∗ -20.806∗∗∗ -22.838∗∗∗ -23.293∗∗∗ -22.816∗∗∗
(0.437) (0.440) (0.441) (0.455) (0.462) (0.455)
N 14936 15150 15003 14606 14440 14605
adj. R2 0.546 0.547 0.551 0.539 0.540 0.539
Industry effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-year effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Optimal threshold 0.550 0.500
Table 2.13 reports the Panel fixed effect regression investigating how financial development affects market competition in
the industry level. The industrial level data are constructed from the Worldscope Database and are aggregated from the
firm level data by the 2-digit SIC code. Only manufacturing industries (SIC 20-39) are included. Standard errors calculated
with clustering at the country level are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.14: Financial development, market competition, and innovation
Capitalization Value traded Turn over Total Private Liquidity Deposit credit
Panel A: Research Quotient from Worldscope
comp*EFD -0.002 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
comp ∗ FD ∗ EFD 0.004∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.003
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Initial share 0.007 0.013 0.015∗ 0.013 0.010 0.013
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
cons 6.191∗∗∗ 6.188∗∗∗ 6.193∗∗∗ 6.353∗∗∗ 6.334∗∗∗ 6.284∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.165) (0.164) (0.166) (0.167) (0.166)
N 6645 6790 6756 6673 6593 6669
adj. R2 0.284 0.283 0.284 0.281 0.271 0.278
Industry effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-year effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Panel B: Patent counts from merged Compustat
comp*EFD 0.002 -0.000 -0.002 0.007∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
comp ∗ FD ∗ EFD -0.013∗∗∗ -0.004 0.001 -0.017∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Initial share 0.919∗∗∗ 0.908∗∗∗ 0.919∗∗∗ 0.918∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗ 0.918∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051)
cons -6.764∗∗ -10.652∗∗∗ -10.413∗∗∗ -16.938∗∗∗ -17.945∗∗∗ -16.941∗∗∗
(2.903) (2.874) (2.916) (2.891) (2.914) (2.896)
N 14936 15150 15003 14606 14440 14605
adj. R2 0.465 0.466 0.466 0.478 0.480 0.478
Industry effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-year effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Panel C: Citation weighted Patent counts from merged Compustat
comp*EFD 0.014∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005)
comp ∗ FD ∗ EFD -0.050∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.016) (0.011) (0.008) (0.014) (0.011)
Initial share 0.984∗∗∗ 0.956∗∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗ 1.004∗∗∗ 0.991∗∗∗ 1.006∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.080) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082)
cons 48.928∗∗∗ 44.810∗∗∗ 46.676∗∗∗ 40.554∗∗∗ 38.046∗∗∗ 40.780∗∗∗
(8.528) (8.393) (8.585) (8.608) (8.806) (8.693)
N 14936 15150 15003 14606 14440 14605
adj. R2 0.243 0.242 0.243 0.249 0.250 0.249
Industry effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-year effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Table 2.14 reports the Panel fixed effect regression investigating how the effect of competition affects innovation with the
level of financial development. The industrial level data are constructed from the Worldscope Database and are aggregated
from the firm level data by the 2-digit SIC code. Only manufacturing industries (SIC 20-39) are included. Standard errors















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.5: An illustration of the heterogeneous effect between emerging and developed economies
Note: Figure 2.5 illustrates the heterogeneous effects of financial development on innovation between developed and
emerging economies. The blue curve, red curve, threshold region, threshold value, and the scale of innovation against
the vertical axis are all hypothetical ones for illustrative purpose. It shows that for a similar range of threshold of
financial development, the effects differ across these two groups.
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Research Quotient Defined as the firm-specific output elasticity of R&D. Author’s Construction from
Worldscope
Patent Counts Aggregation of firm-level number of patent counts by 2-digit SIC code.
Mapping the USPTO with the Compustat North and Global Database.
Authors’ construction
Weighted Patent Aggregation of firm-level number of forward citation weighted patents
by 2-digit SIC code. Mapping the USPTO with the Compustat North
and Global Database.
Authors’ construction
Competition Defined as 100 minus the median value of operating profit margin across





Calculated as capital expenditures plus R&D expenditures minus cash
flows from operations, all divided by the sum of capital expenditures
and R&D expense. Within a country, the time series of each industry’s
dependence on external finance is then calculated as the median of all
firms’ dependence on external finance in a year
Author’s construction
Legal and finance vari-
ables
Legal Origin A dummy variable equal to one if the country is of co [La Porta et al., 1997]
Anti-self dealing(ASD) A measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropri-
ation by corporate insiders in 2003, scaled between zero and one with
higher values indicating stronger shareholder protection
La Porta’s web page
Enforcement Enforceability of contracts. The relative degree to which contractual
agreements are honored. Scaled from 0 to 10 with higher scores indicat-
ing higher enforceability
La Porta’s web page
Banking credit The financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money
banks as a share of GDP.
WBFSD, World Bank
Domestic credit Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided
to the private sector((% of GDP)).
WBFSD, World Bank
Liquidity Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. Liquid liabilities are also known as
broad money, or M3.
WBFSD, World Bank
Stock market capitalization Total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP.,
indicator of equity market size
WBFSD,World Bank
Stock market value traded Total value of all traded shares in a stock market exchange as a percent-
age of GDP., indicator of equity market activity
WBFSD,World Bank
Stock market turnover ratio Total value of shares traded during the period divided by the average




































Saudi Arabia -0.1252 (0.8132)
Singapore 0.4522 (0.1208)
South Africa -0.2070 (0.5186)
Spain 0.0437 (0.9110)





United Kingdom 0.8254 (0.0000)
Table 2.19 reports the correlation coefficient of external
financing dependence index between the U.S. and other
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